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Abstract 
 Recent theoretical developments and case study evidence suggests a relationship 
between the military in politics and corruption. This study contributes to this literature by 
analyzing theoretically and empirically the role of the military in politics and corruption 
for the first time. By drawing on a cross sectional and panel data set covering a large 
number of countries, over the period 1984-2007, and using a variety of econometric 
methods substantial empirical support is found for a positive relationship between the 
military in politics and corruption. In sum, our results reveal that a one standard deviation 
increase in the military in politics leads to a 0.22 unit increase in corruption index. This 
relationship is shown to be robust to a variety of specification changes, different 
econometric techniques, different sample sizes, alternative corruption indices and the 
exclusion of outliers. This study suggests that the explanatory power of the military in 
politics is at least as important as the conventionally accepted causes of corruption, such 
as economic development.  
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1. Introduction 
 
“A rotten apple spoils the barrel.” (English proverb); 
“If you go with the lame, you will learn to limp.” (Italian proverb); 
“Whoever sleeps with a blind-man wakes up crossed-eyed.” (Turkish Proverb); 
“Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.” (Lord Acton); 
“Corruption is nature's way of restoring our faith in democracy.” (Ashleigh Brilliant). 
 
Although, corruption, i.e., ‘misuse of public power for private gain’ is disliked in its 
essence because of its detrimental effects on the development of a country, it is pervasive 
and exists in every country of the world, with varying degrees. Apart from the general 
negative consequences of corruption, it is considered a major obstacle in reducing 
inequality, poverty and infant mortality in developing countries.  
However, corruption perhaps, like the poor, will always be with us. In many 
foreign deals, what would normally be regarded as under-the-table payoffs are 
aboveboard: from the shrewdly sophisticated kickback schemes of the Middle East and 
Latin America, to the virtual Mafia-style and shakedowns of sub-Saharan Africa and 
Indonesia, the universal game of bribery in the pursuit of profit goes on and on1.  
It is widely accepted by economists, development practitioners and policy makers 
that corruption is a real and ever present problem for developing countries. However, 
recently a number of scandals over corruption have shown that rich nations, traditionally 
regarded as corruption free. In Norway and Sweden (often seen as the cleanest nations), 
for example, state owned companies have been found to be involved in bribe taking. 
Similarly, in Germany, former Chancellor Helmut Kohl and his Christian Democratic 
party, the CDU, were shown to be involved in malpractices and they were penalized for 
receiving illegal campaign funding.2 In fact, recent emerging major corruption scandals 
have affected a striking variety of countries all over the world: United States, Japan, Italy, 
France, Germany, South Korea, Mexico and the Kenya. 
In recent years international organizations such as the United Nations, the World 
Bank, the IMF, and OECD have made corruption a significant focus of their agendas and 
have made important attempts to curb corruption in the world, particularly developing 
                                                          
1 http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,922462,00.html#ixzz0acS3mTSS 
2 The CDU received donations from arms industries and it was shown in the process of investigation that the money was indeed a 
commission paid by the company Thyssen for exporting armored tanks to Saudi Arabia. 
 
 
countries that are more prone to corrupt activities for their weak democracies and 
institutes. Understanding the significant effects of corruption on a country’s development 
process has motivated researchers to investigate why corruption exists and what 
determines its high degree of variation across countries. Research on the determinants 
and effect of corruption has proliferated in recent years (see for example Lambsdorff, 
2006 for an excellent review of the relevant literature). Cross-country empirical studies of 
the causes of corruption have investigated a wide range of factors such as economic, 
cultural, political and institutional aspects (see for example Serra, 2006). In addition, 
Ades and Di Tella (1997), Bardhan (1997), Jain (2001), Lambsdorff (2006) and Seldadyo 
and Haan (2006) provide extensive literature reviews. In the wake of the proliferation of 
a large number of studies on corruption, a consensus among academicians and policy 
makers on some of causes of corruption is slowly emerging. However, contentious results 
still abound as researchers adopt different measures of corruption, different conditioning 
information sets, or, more importantly, different samples (see, for example, Ades and Di 
Tella, 1999; Treisman, 2000; Paldam, 2002; Serra, 2006).  
 Many studies have considered ‘political variables’ (see, for example, Treisman, 
2000; Serra, 2006) and a country’s institutional structure (see, for example, Herzfeld and 
Weiss, 2003; Damania et al., 2004) as important determinants of corruption: specifically, 
economies with political stability and strong institutions are less prone to corruption. In 
this paper we explore other avenues that  might explain corruption in order to provide a 
deeper understanding of corruption’ incidence and its variation across nations. The 
motivation behind our search is to provide national governments and international bodies 
with more scientific and factual information on causes of corruption so that curse of 
global corruption can be curbed more effectively. This study indentifies the role of 
military elites in politics as a major factor that fosters corruption. To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first study to highlight this important determinant of corruption. 
According to recent estimates of the World Bank, every year more than US$ 1 
trillion is paid in bribes. The estimates also suggest that countries that control corruption, 
using anti corruption measures, such as improvement in governance and rule of law, can 
dramatically increase their per capita income by a staggering 400 percent. The Institute's 
director for Governance, Daniel Kaufmann, states that the calculated US$1 trillion figure, 
 
 
using 2001-02 economic data, is based on actual bribes that are paid in both developed 
and poor countries. The figure for bribes is striking in comparison to the actual size of the 
world economy at that time, which was just over US$30 trillion (this figure does not 
include stealing of public assets or the embezzlement of public funds). The director states 
that "It is important to emphasize that this is not simply a developing country problem, 
fighting corruption is a global challenge.” 
 The embezzlement of public funds is a very serious matter in many settings, 
however assessing the extent of global embezzlement of public funds is not easy. 
According to Transparency International estimates, for example, the former Indonesian 
leader Suharto embezzled somewhere between $15-35 billion from his country, while 
Abacha in Nigeria, Mobutu in Zaire and Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines, each may 
have embezzled public assets of up to $5 billion. It is noteworthy that all of these leaders, 
except Ferdinand Marcos, have military background meaning that military involvement 
in politics with the outcome of corruption and kickbacks.  
The military is not elected by anyone and for that reason, its intervention in the 
political process of a country, even at a peripheral level, is harmful for the democratic 
process and accountability. Some of its other important implications are as follows: the 
military may be involved in government on account of an actual or created internal or 
external threat to national sovereignty. This situation implies the distortion of government 
policy because certain policy options need to be required and implemented to meet this 
threat; for instance, a reallocation of budget in favor of the military at the cost of other 
important budget allocations. The threat of a military take over can force an elected 
government to change its policy in line with the desires of the military or may even 
replace it by another government more acquiescent to the wishes of the military. If a 
military take over, or a threat of take over, indicates inability of the present government 
to function effectively then the economy will pose high risks for foreign businesses and a 
full-scale military regime poses the greatest risk. Although a military regime may 
temporarily provide stability and therefore reduce risks for businesses in the short term, 
in the longer term risk will almost certainly rise for two major reasons: the system of 
governance will be become corrupt and, second, the continuation of such a government 
may create an armed opposition (International Country Risk Guide, 2008).  
 
 
Recent corruption reports and case studies across the globe have shown that 
military elites in government are no less corrupt then civilian government officials (see 
for detail, Kieh and Agbese, 2004). Recently, Rumsfled, the former secretary of defense 
in the US, raises evidence of government, military corruption. The secretary says 
(admits) that ‘according to some estimates we cannot track $2.3 trillion in transactions’3. 
This is such a huge amount that if we divide it between all American citizens then the 
share for each (every) man, woman and child would be $8000. Similarly, the New York 
Times provides evidence of a vague monetary transaction in the defense department of 
USA, that is ‘the defense department spent an estimated $100 million for airline tickets 
that were not used over a six-year period and failed to seek refunds even though the 
tickets were reimbursable.’4 
This paper adds to the literature on the causes of corruption by addressing the 
following questions: (1) Does having the military in politics foster corruption across 
nations? (2) Does the role of military in politics cause have a different effect on 
corruption depending on the existing level of corruption? (3) What is the role of 
government in reducing the incidence of corruption? (4) What is the effect of inflation on 
corruption, and does the effect vary from the most clean to the most corrupt countries? 
This study differs in several important aspects to previous work in this area. First 
we believe that this study is unique as it provides the first analysis of the military in 
politics, both theoretically and empirically, and therefore should provide a deeper 
understanding of the causes of corruption. Second, this study not only replicates earlier 
findings in the literature on corruption but also provides a better explanation of those 
causes of corruption which are inconclusive and have received least attention using recent 
data sets. Third, in contrasts to previous studies which generally focus one or two years 
of data, we use both cross sectional and panel data sets over a long period of time. Fourth 
this study contributes to the existing literature on the sources of corruption by analyzing 
the distribution of the dependent variable (corruption). Fifth, existing studies on the topic 
focus on either panels or cross sectional data bases which do not distinguish between 
developing and developed countries; in this study we make that distinction clear. Sixth, in 
                                                          
3 CBS News, 1/29/02, U.S. Secretary of Defense raises evidence of government, military corruption 
4  New York Times, 6/9/04 
 
 
 
this study we use a variety of econometric techniques to account for time dynamics and 
to control for the problem of endogeneity.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a review 
of the relevant literature. Section 3 provides a comprehensive discussion of a theoretical 
model of military involvement in politics and its links with corruption. Section 4 provides 
a discussion of the data, while section 5 presents a model and estimation procedure. In 
section 6 we present our empirical findings. Section 7 is our concluding section.  
 
2. Literature Review 
This section has been subdivided into four sections. In section 3.1 we provide a 
comprehensive review of the literature related to military in politics and corruption, 
which we have gathered using academic articles, analyzing case studies, considering 
scholarly arguments and speeches from all over the world. In section 3.2 we discuses 
theoretical model of the causes of the military engagement in politics, while theories of 
civil-military relations are explained in section 3.3. Finally, we present a theory of the 
relationship between military in politics and corruption in section 3.4. 
 
3.1 Theory: Military in Politics and Corruption  
Ball (1981) analytically evaluates the political role of third-world militaries for two 
reasons. First, the military-dominated governments are least responsive to the needs and 
voices of the poor majority in developing world. In addition, in order to curb civilian 
demands and unrest, military-dominated governments use arms far more frequently than 
civilian-dominated governments. Second, as the role of the military in politics grows, so 
its control over scarce resources of the country increases and a greater amount of these 
scarce resources is channeled into the military sector or activities closely related to the 
military. 
The author identifies four major societal groups that most likely benefit from the 
involvement of the military in the economic and political life of a country: domestic 
civilian groups, the military as an institution, the individuals within the military and 
foreign groups. Using examples and case evidences, the author outlines the reasons why 
each of theses groups may favor military intervention into the economic and political life 
 
 
of a country. The author also discusses the ways in which the interests of these four 
groups coincide. One important reason, among others, for them to favor military 
intervention in politics, is the maximization of personal wealth through corrupt activities. 
In other words, corruption is an important element attached to military intervention in the 
political and the economic life of a country. 
When the militaries seek to get involved in the political process of a country, 
allies are sought among bureaucrats, technocrats and politicians. In military-dominated 
government the collaboration of the civil service is vital because a country can not be 
administrated solely with military man power, not even one as entrenched as that in 
Brazil, Thailand and Indonesia. It is generally argued that the military and the civilian 
bureaucracy are best allies (Edward Feit, 1973). 
Military leaders improve their personal financial condition by frequent 
involvement in the economic system. To do this, they seek close working relations with 
local and foreign businessmen. The military manages a secure business environment 
while businessmen provide capital and entrepreneurial skills. The engagement of the 
military in economic corruption is greatest when the military are involved in the political 
process. In other words, the opportunities for economic corruption for the military are 
greatest when its role in politics increases. The civilian leaders provide opportunities for 
senior army officials to increase their personal wealth in reward for their loyalty to the 
stability of the political regime. Politicians may approach the military for direct 
intervention in government, to limit the power of political opponents, or the politician 
may tacitly acquiesce to such involvement. For instance, the occurrence of a series of 
coups in Sierra Leone in 1967 was motivated by Albert Margai who wanted control of 
the government (Anton Bebler, 1973). 
 It is generally argued in the literature on the political role of the military in third-
world countries that the armed forces defend the interests of the middle class or, more 
specifically, the interests of the third world elites. It is true, for example, in the case of 
Latin America where the elite seek military intervention in order to exclude the mass of 
the population from political and economic decision making. The elites want such 
exclusion because they have a fear that increased participation of the poor people in the 
economic and political system will alter the rules of game, which will not be favorable to 
 
 
the elites. Third world elites not only defend themselves against the dissolution of a 
political and economic system, which enables them to accumulate personal wealth and 
power, but they also want to maintain their position within that system (Eboe Hutchful, 
1979). 
The military as an institution 
As an institution the military has many justifications for seeking a political role. Four 
important reasons are discussed below5. First of all, the military wants to maintain an 
increase in the military’s share of national resources. Case studies often note that one 
reason for a military take over a rise in military expenditures is evidenced, such as a rise 
in salaries, new military hardware are ordered, and new facilities are provided to the 
officers and their families. For instance, military expenditures rose by an average of 22% 
per year in Ghana over the period 1966-69, following a military coup against Nkrumah’s 
government (Anton Bebler, 1973). This is in fact a reflection of the fact that prior to the 
coup Nkrumah had placed the army on an austerity budget. 
A second reason for the role of military in politics is simply the maintenance and 
survival of the armed forces within a country and this is often seen when attempts are 
made to undermine military hierarchy. For example, in the case of Brazil, President 
Goulart tried to counter the power of top military officers and consequently was 
overthrown by the military in April 1964 (Eric A Nordlinger, 1977). The military also 
gets involved in political power if a politician, who was removed by the military in past, 
becomes active again. For example, it is one of the key reasons for the coups in Ecuador 
and Guatemala during 1963 (Martin Needler, 1964; Nordlinger, 1977).  
A third reason for military involvement in politics is fear of national 
disintegration. For example, military officers often argue that their intervention in politics 
is necessary because civilian governments are inefficient, corrupt and incapable of 
governing a country and as a result the country is plagued by widespread political, 
economic and social disorders. In fact, a military intervention or take over becomes easy 
in the presence of weak, poorly elected civilian-dominated governments. These 
governments often fail to respond to the voices and needs of a large segment of society. 
                                                          
5 See for example ball (1981) for more details. 
 
 
 
As a result, military-dominated governments are initially welcomed because they promise 
to curb corruption and to respond to the needs of the poor people. However, in practice 
military governments do not follow through on these pledges. The evidence shows that 
the military-dominated governments appear as inefficient and corrupt as their civilian 
predecessors.  
A fourth reason for military involvement is the extension of the concept of 
‘national security’ to include internal securities. Militaries not only devise military 
techniques and doctrine for confronting domestic insurgency but they are also interested 
in the social and political reasons for insurgency. In countries where civilian-dominated 
governments are more unrepresentative, the military comes to power in an attempt to 
institutionalize their role, such as in Indonesia, Chile and Brazil. At present, most 
developing world militaries are mainly concerned with internal security that implies in 
future military officers throughout the world will be more interested in politics and 
government. 
Individuals within the military 
The enhancement of personal power and wealth is a key factor and a top priority for 
individuals within the military who seek a political role for the military. It is evident from 
case studies of military-dominated governments that the maximization of personal power 
and wealth is indeed a very high priority for a large number of coup leaders. There are a 
number of ways through which individuals within the military, especially officers, 
enhance their personal wealth. It is often the case that military expenditures increase 
because officers want high salaries, better housing, other privileges, such as medical and 
educational facilities, for their families.  
More lucrative opportunities are associated with the involvement of military 
officers in the political process of the country. ‘The best opportunities are, of course, in 
those counties where bribery, rake-offs and other forms of corruption flourish as a matter 
of course’ (Nordlinger, 1977). In Sudan, for example, military officers acquired restricted 
public land for their own use, undertook public projects for their own benefits and 
demanded money for the provision of import licenses. Following the first coup in Ghana, 
for example, the salaries of the military officers rose substantially and foreign exchange 
 
 
was used to buy luxury goods, like Mercedes Benz automobiles, for military officers 
(Nordlinger, 1977). 
In general, personal wealth maximization is easy to achieve in cases where the 
military take over the government, but this is not a necessary condition, as the 
enhancement of personal wealth is also facilitated even in civilian-dominated 
governments where military officers are appointed to top bureaucratic posts, which 
provide them with ample opportunities for enriching themselves through corruption and 
kickbacks. These top bureaucratic positions allow them to get involved with private 
companies and divert government expenditures into investments that are mutually 
beneficial for military officers and private companies. Similarly, they may also divert 
economic development assistance to their own uses as well as for bribe seeking by 
favoring the interests of private companies. Indonesia and Thailand are the best examples 
of this type of arrangements. Bienen and Morell (1974) conclude for Thailand that: 
“Widespread participation in and tolerance of corruption play a crucial role in 
maintaining military cohesion, cutting across factional or personal cleavages to produce 
common requirements for mutual protection. Factional competitors on governmental 
issues may sit on the same corporate boards or participate jointly in the spoils from a 
participate contract. If no one at the top is ‘clean’, no one can betray his fellows”.  
Furthermore, Silcock (1967) for the case of Thailand, “lists 154 government 
enterprises which are capitalized at $490 million. Of these, forty-nine, are capitalized at 
$393 million, or 80 percent of the total, and are administered by the prime minister’s 
office and the ministries of defense, interior, and communications, all of which are 
headed by army generals. Writing of fourteen major enterprises which are owned and 
managed by the Ministry of Defence, Silcock comments, ‘…they produce little which is 
of any military significance, and... bring little return to the government. Their chief 
function appears to be to provide livelihood and patronage.”  
Tangri and Mwenda (2003) provide an excellent documentation of corrupt 
military procurement in Uganda since the late 1990s. They point out that military 
corruption began to rise when the National Resistance Movement (NRM) government in 
power began acquiring more and larger military equipment, mainly through third parties. 
In the late 1990s, many tenders were entered into for aircraft, tanks, guns, food rations 
 
 
and uniforms. These deals invariably created opportunities for bribes and kickbacks 
which benefited most to the army officers, middle man and top government officials. For 
instance, in the 1996 the NRM government decided to buy four MI-24 helicopter 
gunships from Russia. This decision motivated many interests to lobby the government to 
supply helicopters. Among them a Kampala, Emmanuel Katto, brother in law of the 
Ugandan Chief of Defense Staff General James Kazini, contacted his overseas partners 
and successfully lobbied to secure the contract for his overseas partner in a company 
Consolidated Sales Corporation (CSE). This deal produced a contract without any 
bidding taking place and the Ugandan government paid $12.2 million dollar to CSE for 
the helicopter gunships, but in reality these helicopters were purchased from a company 
in Belarus for only $4.7 million which means that $4.5 million was the cost of corruption. 
Furthermore, the helicopters were in such bad condition that they remained grounded at 
Enteblx air force base. So, in reality government lost $12 million on the deal. 
Tangri and Mwenda (2003) also document illicit business activities of top military 
commanders of the Ugandan army engaged in military operation in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC). In August 1998, Ugandan soldiers were deployed to curb the 
rebels threatening the security of Uganda and destabilizing the stability of NRM 
government. Nevertheless, the Ugandan Peoples Defense Force (UPDF) crossed the 
border security and entered into the areas of Eastern Congo to plunder the natural 
resources. 
In fact, Congo became a veritable treasure trove for top military commanders who 
became wealthy from stealing and resource plunder, together with their civilian partners. 
Specifically, officers have been engaged in smuggling resources - gold, diamonds, timber 
and coffee - from the DRC to Uganda. The in charge of operation, major-general Salim 
Saleh has been alleged of rewarding his own company a $400,000 monthly tender to 
supply UDPF with commodities in Gulu. Salim Saleh was also involved with Trinity 
Investment Limited (TIL). This company was alleged for not paying import duties to 
ruler while importing into DRC and for not paying taxes while exporting gold, timber and 
coffee into Uganda. 
Tangri and Mwenda (2003) note weak and limited accountability on matters of 
military and civil servant corruption. They write ‘and not a single army officer, senior 
 
 
civil servant or top government minister has found prosecution or punishment for their 
alleged misdeeds’. The authors also note that military intervention in government affairs 
is high because there were mutual interests like president Museveni wanted to keep his 
power and kept strong ties with top military officials to ensure their loyalty.  
Money generated through corrupt procurement was awarded to top military 
officials for their loyalty and spent on NRM’s political patronage system to ensure 
stability and strong power of the government. In fact, top military officers-Salim Saleh 
and James Kazinin-have been identified as being massively involved in many of the 
corruption deals. The military officers benefited from corrupt deals and substantial funds 
have been reserved for president’s political projects. This is why when president 
Museveni’s presidency was challenged in 2001, many commanders supported Museveni 
and campaigned against the presidency challengers. Many senior army officers were 
‘particularly sensitive to any threats to prosecute or follow them up for any commissions 
or omission under Museveno’ (Aliro, 2002). Wakabi, (2000c) also notes that the above 
discussed military corruption is closely associated with Ugandan politics. For example, 
president Museneri was involved in military corruption and support of corrupt elements. 
The president refuted ‘claim of corrupt business dealing and embezzlement by his top 
military commanders’. 
Amuwo (1986) documents the role of military in politics and corruption for the 
state of Niger. The author notes that military involvement in politics is based on good 
factors-rigor, accountability, order, probity, discipline, etcetera- but actually these 
vaunted factors are of limited utility once military officers get in involved in the political 
process and governance. In fact, they are also involved in the internal dynamics of the 
civil society due to financial and economic advantages. The author says that military 
growing class badly spoils its own hands instead of implementing anti-corruption 
measures.  
Recently, the Niger state governor, Bakongida Aliyu, blamed corrupt practices in 
the Niger to the involvement of military in the politics. He said the military rule has 
eroded service delivery in all sectors of the national economy. The governor argued that 
the incursion of the military into politics bred corruption because the military rule makes 
it difficult for people to resist poor service dealing. He said ‘the military instituted 
 
 
corruption and the old men who were supposed to talk were contented with little gifts’. 
He further said ‘during the military regime, we had people who could not make one N1 
million in 10 years making it in one day’.6 
Ghosal (2009) evaluates the recent military intervention in the politics of 
Bangladesh. The main hypothesis of this study is that military involvement in politics is 
changing its pattern in countries like Pakistan and Bangladesh. The study labels this new 
pattern ‘power with out responsibility’ which would seem to bode ill for domestic 
development in both countries. Ghosal argues that in Bangladesh, as in Pakistan, the 
army does not necessarily directly come to power but controls the establishment in the 
background and destabilizes politicians. If this type of military intervention benefits the 
country then the military takes the credit, but if it does not benefit the country the blame 
is passed to the establishment. Ghosal concludes that ‘a new model of military 
intervention in politics—rule without responsibility and accountability—has emerged in 
Pakistan and Bangladesh, which obviously has both long- and short-term implications for 
political developments in third world countries and, thus, requires closer scrutiny and 
analysis’. 
Moudud Ahamn, criticizes military involvement in government and blame 
massive corruption in Bangladesh to military’s involvement in government. Specifically, 
he criticizes the military take over of Bangladesh in 2001. He gives the reference of 
International Transparency (2008) which shows that corruption has increased since the 
military take over in January 2007. He argues that the problem with military intervention 
is that people are deprived of the choice ‘to have any voice or control at all over those 
aspects of their destiny and daily life which interfere with the state’. He says that ‘a 
military dictator decides on his own. He becomes, in effect, an unelected King 
answerable to no one’. He further argues that Bangladesh is facing state plundering by 
military rulers just like Pakistan and Indonesia. The people of Bangladesh are being 
deprived of their liberty and the military intervention is causing economic and social 
disorder.7 
                                                          
6 (Source:http://thenationonlineng.net/web2/articles/24167/1/Military-institutionalised-corruption-says-Aliyu/Page1.html) 
7 http://moududahmed.com/3.html 
 
 
Bhakti et al. (2009) document the history of the military in Indonesia, its role in 
politics and its role in perpetrating violence. The role of the military in politics had been 
defined during the Sukarno (1945-1965) and Suharto eras (1966-1998). However, 
following military reform era (beginning mid-1998), the role of the military has been 
reduced. Despite various stages of military reform, the military involvement in politics in 
different forms still exists. The authors argue that given the historical dual role of the 
military, the military ‘has been able to set agendas and perpetrate violence without 
civilian oversight’. For instance, this has led to different acts of violence in Papua, 
perpetrated by the police and military. 
The case evidence, at least from Thailand and Indonesia, suggests that corrupt 
patron-client networks are mainly controlled by political elites in the government, the 
military, and the bureaucracy (Rock, 2000; Rock and Bonnett, 2004). Rock (2000) 
argues, with reference to Thailand’s bureaucratic polity, that a centralized patron-client 
corruption network between political elites, senior bureaucrats and top military officers 
developed in the presence of the military in politics and in the absence of a democratic 
process. ‘In this centralized patron-client network, senior government officials provided 
protectionist rents to a small number of Sino-Thai entrepreneurs in exchange for 
kickbacks. As in Indonesia, the government protected private property and extracted rents 
at a low enough tax rate to entice entrepreneurs to invest, which they did’.  
 In the case of Indonesia, Mcleod (2005) argues that the president managed a 
franchise system during Soeharto’s New Order government. This franchise system 
provided strong incentives for public officials to pursue growth oriented policies and 
enrich themselves through corrupt activities. ‘In this model, rents were collected by 
simple extortion and by public sector policies that enabled the regime’s cronies to amass 
protectionist rents. Government officials – in political parties, the judiciary, the 
bureaucracy, the military – and Soeharto’s family participated in this franchise system 
through kickbacks, awards of government contracts, and through the granting of 
monopolies to cronies. Soeharto’s franchise system protected both private property and 
taxed economic activities at a low enough rate to encourage private sector actors to invest 
in productive activity’. 
 
 
  Tangri and Mwenda (2009) conduct a case study on Uganda and point out that 
Uganda state elites - government officials, bureaucrats, army - have maximized personal 
wealth by seeking kickbacks and corruption. Apart from corrupt activities, other motives 
have been political consolidation for the elites. They note that top political administrators 
and military officials were allowed to exploit their positions for personal gain and they 
were also obliged to use their funds to support the stability of the political regime. In fact, 
resources from high levels of corruption have been used for both political mobilization 
and personal wealth maximization. ‘They argue that state elites – cabinet ministers, 
senior civil servants, and army officers – have abused their positions for personal gain’. 
Kieh and Agbese (2004) argue that in the African experience of the military and 
politics is one in which the main motivation in nearly every military coup is an anti 
corruption stance. However, in practice, once they are in office, the military do not show 
a lesser tendency towards corruption compared to civilian politicians. In reality, facts and 
figures about systematic plundering of the public treasury in Ghana, Nigeria, Zaire, and 
many other countries show that military elites are even more corrupt than civilian 
politicians. For example, Gen. Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire and Gen. Sani Abacha of 
Nigeria have been alleged to have been involved in corrupt enrichment through the 
transfer of the state’s budget into the private coffers of the head of state. 
McNulty (1999) contends that Mobutu’s fortune estimated at ‘between $6 billion 
and $10 billion in 1997…was accrued at the expense of his country’s economy and 
natural resources, through creation of the quintessential vampire state’ William Reno 
(1998) has shown how Mobutu systemically privatized the public coffer by allocating the 
bulk of government revenues to the presidency. Ude (1999) provides an analysis of the 
scope of corruption under the Abacha regime, in which Abacha and his family members 
looted huge sums of money from state coffers. Following the sudden death of Abacha in 
June 1998, his family left the official residence in haste and many of their belongings 
were not removed. The items left behind were 52 luxury cars and a stock of local and 
foreign currency in huge industrial crates, among other items. Abacha’s successor, 
appropriated the embezzled money from the family and, under intensive pressure, made 
the family return over 220 billion Naira to the government. 
 
 
In addition, Kieh and Agbese (2004) note that in cases where military officers are 
not massively engaged in looting of the state treasury, they tend to increase substantially 
defense budget and this bodes ill for the country’s economic welfare. In virtually every 
African country during a military regime, expenditures on defense and security massively 
increase while expenditures on education, health and social services decline. For 
example, following a military coup in Liberia, defense and security expenditures 
increased dramatically from $17.8 million to $44.6 million over the period 1978-81 
(Elwood Dunn and Byron Tarr, 1988).  
Obasanjo (1999) also contends for Nigeria that military involvement in politics 
fosters corruption. He asserts that ‘no matter how noble the intentions of the pioneer 
coup-makers may have been, the prolonged involvement of the military in the 
administration and management of the state had aggravated the problems of political 
instability and deepened corruption within our society’. Soldiers in Ethiopia came to 
power promising to bring justice, administrative efficiency and a corruption free society 
but Apter and Rosberg (1994) note that military rulers control over politics and the 
economy in fact increased corruption and ruined the economy. 
Dr. Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha8, in an online interview conducted by despardes.com’s 
Editor-in-Chief Irshad Salim, reveals that military generals in Pakistan are worth Rs 500 
million (US $9.8 million) each. She explains the way in which the military establishment 
of Pakistan has systemically looted the country and points out that the military generals 
are no more than thieves. 
 In Siddiqa-Agha (2007) it is revealed that the military is entrenched in the 
corporate sector of the country and Pakistan's companies are in the hands of senior army 
officials. The private business empire of Pakistan’s military is worth approximately £10 
billion. Both in-service and retired army officials control secretive industrial 
conglomerates, which manufacture everything from cement to cornflakes and the military 
also owns 12m acres of public land. Her findings suggest that the Pakistan army, through 
predatory engagement in the political and economic process, has amassed great wealth. 
She also points out that the military elites foster economic corruption in partnership with 
                                                          
8 She is an ex civil servant a scholar of Pakistan's military and security affairs and a regular contributor to 
several Pakistani and internationally renowned opinion journals.  
 
 
other civilian elites, such as the civil bureaucracy and entrepreneurial class. It is worth 
noting that Siddiqa-Agha’s book has been banned in Pakistan.   
Recently, Thailand’s military-backed government has been alleged to have been 
involved in corruption cases involving illegal campaign donations. In April and May 
2010, Red Shirt protestors in Thailand created chaos and may cause a collapse of the 
military-backed government for its corrupt activities and uneasy political paradigm.9 
 
3.2 Theoretical models of causes of military engagement in politics 
In this section we present theoretical models of the causes of military engagement in 
politics. The literature provides many theoretical models as explanatory framework for 
military involvement in politics. These theoretical models can be classified as follows: 
the personalist, corporatist, manifest destiny, Marxist and integrative theoretical models. 
We now briefly discuss each of these models. 
The personalist model  
According to this model the military intervene in the political arena of a country for three 
reasons. First, the military rulers seek intervention in politics for personal power 
enhancement. Second, poor socioeconomic conditions of the country are justified for 
staging a coup, but the essential motive behind such coups is the personal agenda of 
military rulers for raw power and self-aggrandizement. Third, usually, it is the military 
leader himself who is the principal agent for the execution of the coup plot, with the 
support of his likeminded fellows and assistants. 
The corporatist model  
According to this model the military is a corporate entity meaning that individuals within 
the army have certain collective tendencies ‘that make them develop a singleness of 
purpose’ (Welch, 1987). Basically, the armed forces consider themselves a separate 
corporate body and all civilian groups as another corporate body. The armed forces 
consider themselves remarkably different from civilians. Certainly, such a perception on 
the part of the military represents ‘the conduct of civil-military relation as a zero sum 
game’. 
                                                          
9 http://www.asiasentinel.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2599&Itemid=387 
 
 
 
A further element of the model is that the armed forces share a collective interest, such as 
the maintenance of high military budget, the protection of military status, the protection 
of military rules, procedures, and norms and so on. The military intervention in politics is 
inevitable if civilian regimes attempt to undermine the collective interests of the army.  
The manifest destiny model 
The term manifest destiny model was coined by Finer (1988). This model is based on the 
concept that military officials are arrogant and they consider themselves superior to 
civilians and consider they are the only savior of the interests of the nation.  
According to this model the military justifies its intervention on the bases that civilian 
regimes suffering from mal-administration and chaos and it is the military that can 
effectively protect and defend the national interest. 
Marxist model 
The Marxist model is based on following main arguments. First, the model links the 
military in politics with the issues embodied in the general crises of underdevelopment 
and predatory effects of the capitalist system. It treats the problem of military in politics 
as part of crises of underdevelopment while the crises of underdevelopment have their 
genesis in globalization of the capitalist system and the imposition of colonialism. 
Second, the capitalist system has created two general classes, the propertied and the non-
propertied. According to the model state officials tend to protect and promote narrow 
particularistic interests of the propertied class. Third, the inequality of resource 
distribution causes class confliction, resentment, and struggles. These struggles are likely 
to destabilize incumbent civilian regimes. Fourth, in such a state of affairs, the military 
find an opportunity to step in political sphere of the nation. However, historically, the 
military protects interests of the few elites (ruling class). Thereby it is not ‘capable of 
prosecuting a systematic transformation of neo-classical nation’. 
The integrative model 
This model is based on the idea that military intervention is not motivated by a single 
factor but by a confluence (host) of factors. These factors can be categorized as personal, 
corporatist, the messianic complex, social, political and economic. The economic, 
political and social problems under civilian regimes, in combination of other motives of 
the armed soldiers, are usually justified for the military coups or engagement in politics. 
 
 
 3.3 Theories of civil-military relations 
The literature provides three major theoretical models of civil-military relations: the 
Classic (or Western), Communist (or subjective control) and the Praetorian models (for 
further details see: Welch, 1976; Herspring and Volges, 1978; Perlmutter and Plave, 
1980; Adekson, 1981; Kolkowicz and Korbonsk, 1982; Crouch and Haji, 1985; Kieh and 
Agbese, 2004). 
The classic model  
The classic model of civil-military relation is supposed to prevail in the developed market 
economies. The essential proposition of the model is submission and subordination of the 
military to civilian control and supremacy. According to the western model, the military 
neither participates in politics nor questions the political supremacy of elected politicians. 
In fact, elected politicians and the military have a clear and unambiguous separation of 
power where the military respects supremacy of the politicians. In this context, Kemp and 
Hurdlin (1994) claim that it is a moral obligation of soldiers to respect civilian control. In 
the same way, Finer (1975) emphasizes that the respect for civilian supremacy by the 
military in fact holds back political intervention. Under the classic model, the role and 
responsibilities of the military are set up by civilian authorities and the military cannot 
surpass the parameters of the rule and responsibilities established by the civilian 
authorities. In these societies citizens have a right to evaluate national security policies. A 
major advantage of the civilian control is that it promotes professionalism within the 
armed forces. As Huntington (1957) notes that essential objective of civilian control and 
supremacy over the military is maximization of autonomous military professionalism. 
The communist model  
The communist model of civil-military relations does not assume political independence 
of the military. According to this model the military engages in politics through the ruling 
political party and follow the ideology of the party. The purpose of participation is to 
guard and maintain the hegemony (supremacy) of the ruling political party over state and 
society. As Perlmutter (1982) notes, other than guarding the heroic party the military 
‘identifies its value with that of the party’. In brief, under this model, the military is not 
free from politics and its political role depends on the ruling political party. 
 
 
The praetorian model  
In the praetorian model, civil-military relations are not stable as in the classic model and 
the military elites are among the top contenders (candidates) for political power. This 
model prevails in those countries where political institutions are weak and fragile, in 
combination with the issues and crises of underdevelopment, Politicians lake the ability 
to hold civilian supremacy over armed forces. Huntington (1968) contends that ‘in a 
praetorian system there is the absence of effective political institutions capable of 
mediating, refining and moderating group political actions. Social forces confront each 
other nakedly: no political institutions, no corps of professional political leaders are 
recognized and accepted as legitimate intermediaries to moderate group conflicts. Each 
group employs means which, reflect its peculiar nature and capabilities to decide upon 
office and policy…. The techniques of military intervention are simply more dramatic 
and effective than the others’. 
 
3.4 Theory: military in politics and corruption  
This study asks whether the involvement of the military in politics fosters corruption. 
Although historical facts, case evidence, recent emerging corruption scandals all over the 
world, as well as scholarly argument suggest a relationship between the military, politics 
and government surprisingly, no one to our knowledge has systematically developed 
theoretical links of the relationship and, equally, no one has tested this relationship. 
The available evidence on the relationship between the military in politics and 
corruption is largely based on country level descriptive studies and focuses on 
information culled from scandals, allegations, speeches and reports. Although such 
studies do indeed suggest there is a relationship, they do not provide any firm 
econometric or statistical analyses. This is the novelty of our study in that we compile 
evidence on the relationship between the military in politics and corruption from around 
the world and analyze it using econometric methods for a large set of countries over a 
long period of time. 
The purpose of this section is to develop a systematic and logical theory (the links 
or channels) of the relationship between military in politics and corruption. It is important 
to mention that the involvement of military in politics is caused by a host of factors and 
 
 
generates a range of consequences. In this study, however, we just focus on a particular 
aspect of the consequences, namely corruption, and leave the analysis of other 
consequences such as the impact on inequalities and poverty for future research. 
Why and how does having the military in government foster corruption? In order 
to answer these important questions, we will develop theoretical channels/links that 
consider the importance of the military budget, power and wealth, collusion amongst the 
elite in a country, control of top administrative positions, natural resources and foreign 
groups in shaping the link. 
Military spending 
The role of military spending is critical in shaping the relationship between the military, 
government and corruption because it is the factor that motivates top military officials to 
intervene in government for maintenances or increase of the share of military in national 
resources. Most often, military coups occur when democratic governments attempt to 
keep the military on an austerity budget. Once military commanders hold positions in part 
of the government machinery, or in extreme cases when democratic governments are 
replaced by a military regime, then increase in military spending is inevitable. Of course 
the opportunity cost of the rising military spending is seen in reduced public spending 
elsewhere in the economy, such as education, health and welfare subsidies, among others 
and this has knock on consequences for human capital formation (in terms of lower 
finance available for education and health), among others, and weakens the strength of 
anti-corruption measures. 
Secondly, when militaries have a greater share in the national resources of a 
country then procurement of military hardware and arm trades are the inevitable out 
comes. Both historical evidence and current patterns show that the military procurement 
is highly susceptible to corruption because of limited scrutiny, audit and massive over 
payments. Another reason for corruption in the case of military procurement is the lack of 
competition. For example, Wilson et al. (2006) provide evidence that governments tender 
out 50 percent or more of their defense procurement requirements to a single supplier. 
Similarly, according to a survey by Control Risks (2006), one third of international 
defense companies realized that they had lost out on a contract in the last year because of 
corruption by a competitor. 
 
 
Military operations other than war (MOOTW) principles are an extension of war 
fighting doctrine. Embodied in these principles is the dominance of political objectives at 
all levels of MOOTW10. In the literature on military operations there is distinction 
between war and other operations. For example, Story and Gottlieb (1995) provide a 
military operational frame work in which they divide military operations into combat, 
noncombat and simultaneous operations. The combat operations include war, operations 
to restore order and retaliatory actions while noncombat operations include show of 
force, truce-keeping, support and assistance operations. Some military operations could 
involve combat and non combat at the same time and these operations are considered as 
simultaneous operations. The simultaneous operations are combating terrorism, exclusion 
zone operations, ensuring freedom of navigation, non combatant evacuation operations 
and recovery operations. 
In the presence of the military operations (either combat or non combat 
operations) one direct effect is a rise in the military budget. The military officials find 
further discretion (flexibility) over manipulation of the military budget for private gains. 
For example, according to Transparency International (2007) defense institutions 
(ministries and armed forces) are “profiteering from soldiers’ payroll (e. g. extracting 
percentages from total cash; ghost soldiers; adding cronies on secret pay rolls)”. A range 
of the military operations increase military control over security posts. According to 
Transparency International (2007) defense officials extract money to pass security and 
other check points. 
The military operations could be corruption prone because monitoring of field 
commanders is not strong as the evidence suggest from African countries. Specifically, 
when troops are deployed in a large and complex terrain then checks on fields’ 
commanders are limited.  
Fourthly, military leaders often manipulate tenders for personal gain. The tenders 
for even routine items like uniforms and food are often severely manipulated and usually 
awarded to companies which are non competitive in order to create payoffs for military 
officials. Finally, top military officials manipulate the military budget for personal and 
family reasons, such as salaries, medical support, education, foreign visits and so on. 
                                                          
10 http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/jp3-07.pdf 
 
 
Having discussed these arguments, we can say that an unjustified rise in military 
spending with out tight monitoring and accountability leaves the margin for kickbacks 
and corrupt activities. 
Personal power-wealth maximization and regime stability 
In this case, civilian governments seek military engagement to mobilize the military 
support for regime stability. The civilian leaders provide opportunities for senior army 
officials to increase their wealth as a reward for their loyalty in ensuring the stability of 
the political regime and, in turn, the military officials also spend part of their time 
accumulating wealth (through corruption and kickbacks) for political patronage and to 
ensure the stability and strong power of the government. Both top officials in the military 
and civilian leaders want to maximize their vested interests, where political leaders want 
regime stability and the military want personal gains without sacrificing their status 
within the military hierarchy. The joint motive of power-wealth maximization and regime 
stability is best served through pay-offs. 
Top bureaucratic and administrative positions 
According to the manifest destiny theoretical model (Finer, 1988), military commanders 
are arrogant and consider themselves superior to the civilian rulers and seek to hold top 
bureaucratic and administrative posts. However, they lack a professional approach and 
attempt to control things with power and by satisfying the interests of few and it is often 
the case that they exploit their power in administrative and bureaucratic posts for private 
gain. In doing so, they award government contracts to private companies in reward for 
money. 
Elites’ collusion 
Military elites have a tendency to collude with political, administrative and bureaucratic 
elites in society. The basic motive behind collusion of all of these elites is the exclusion 
of the mass of the population from economic and political decision making processes. 
The elite want such exclusivity because they fear that increased participation of the poor 
people in economic and political system will alter the rules of the game which will not be 
favorable for the elite. The elites not only defend against the dissolution of the political 
and economic system, which enables them to accumulate personal wealth and power, but 
they also want to maintain their positions within that system. 
 
 
The elites also control corrupt patron-client networks. The centralized corrupt 
patron-client networks usually evolve with the involvement of the military into politics 
and are likely to vanish in the presence of democratic process. The basic purpose of 
centralized patron-client networks by the elites is to provide protection rents to 
entrepreneurs in exchange for kickbacks. The elite collusion rewards few at the cost of 
the mass of the population, thereby generating important income inequalities in 
economies where these factors exist.  
Kickbacks and corruption are the key elements, among others, that keep the elites 
united and protect mutual interests. Exclusion of the mass of the population from 
economic and political decision making inhibit (limit) their abilities to monitor corruption 
or, most importantly, even if it is generally known that corruption deals take place, the 
public can not force or devise punishment because their voice is low and usually curbed. 
The institutions like judiciary, law and order all are weekend in the presence of 
strong ties of the elites and the system cannot itself make break the unison of the elites. In 
order to protect their mutual interests, and in view of a possible conflict amongst the elite, 
they develop family ties through institutions such as marriage, to reinforce their interests. 
Dissolution of the elites is unlikely because if any one class of elites disagrees 
with others and isolates itself from the group, then the cost of isolation is much higher 
than the gain. The major cost of isolation is possible legal prosecution (action) against 
past misdeeds. This is analogous to the prisoner’s dilemma where benefits are maximized 
if no one betrays the others. 
Because armed soldiers have the power to rebel against the state or create a coup, 
their independence from politics serves as an ever present threat to the body politic if 
they are tempted to become corrupt. Conversely, if the military itself departs from its 
professionalism and joins the civilian elite then there is no further threat to corruption 
unless some form of mass revolt from the general public occurs, which is indeed a rare 
case. 
Natural resources and rent seeking 
There is a vast body of literature that provides theoretical models and empirical evidence 
on the relationship between natural resources and rent seeking activities. Many studies 
find that natural resources generate rent seeking activities (see for example Leite and 
 
 
Weidmann, 2002). In a very recent study, Bhattacharyya and Holder (2010) predict in 
their game-theoretic model that (only) economies where the quality of democratic 
institutions is poor, natural resources cause corruption. They also provide empirical 
support for their theoretical prediction by testing the proposition for 124 economies over 
the period 1980-2004.  
We apply and extend the theory of natural resources, rent seeking and corruption 
to the relationship between military, government and corruption. In the context of classic 
models of the role of military (Huntington, 1957; Hurdlin, 1994), soldiers cannot 
manipulate economic resources for private gain; however, in the case of so-called 
praetorian models (Huntington, 1968) they have control over economic and natural 
resources. The basic point is that the military have control over natural resources once 
they get involved in the political and economic sphere of a country and, additionally 
checks and balances on military official are limited. In this context they will plunder 
natural resources for themselves, and divert natural resources to the military and 
associated sectors. On the other hand, for countries which are resource abundant but have 
strong democratic institutions, the classic models of military’s role in politics suggest that 
their rent seeking activities are checked by the accountability of democratic governments 
to their the people. 
During military regimes, or military backed government, the distribution of public 
lands is often skewed towards armed forces and commercial housing schemes come 
under the control of top military officials and the control of such housing schemes also 
generate kickbacks and corruption opportunities for the military commanders.  
Foreign elites (groups) 
Foreign governments, specifically from developed countries, may support military 
engagement in politics, as a means of advancing their own political-strategic and 
economic interests. It is relatively easy to manipulate the policies of developing countries 
through military backed governments, rather than through civilian governments. This is a 
vast topic and there are a number of issues that are important in shaping the role of 
foreign groups; however, we shall focus on the link of foreign elites in the presence of 
military in governments and its effect on increasing corruption. 
 
 
Foreign businessmen (elites) look for countries where a secure business 
environment is available especially if it is available in a military regime or military-
dominated government. The military provides a safe and secure environment. This is not 
on a voluntary basis, but military officials look for their private gains and wealth 
enhancement via kickbacks and corruption. Furthermore, militaries can easily manipulate 
national polices because they are not accountable to the general public and policies may 
be manipulated to favor the interest of foreign elites in reward for money. 
Military governments spend a lot of money on infrastructure projects such as 
roads, bridges and so on and their spending generally satisfies the requirements of foreign 
elites plus tenders of the projects to generate kickbacks opportunities. Similarly, arm 
trades also flourish during the regimes of military-backed governments and these trades 
require massive spending of money and are subject to limited scrutiny and accountability. 
The MNCs flourish in military dominated governments, and these firms consider 
bribes as just as a cost of production and transfer this amount in the price of their goods 
and enjoy many privileges under military regimes. The military dominated governments 
also privatize public entities on non competitive bases to foreign stake holders and enrich 
themselves with the commission. For example, according to Transparency International 
(2007) defense institutions (ministries and armed forces) are “profiteering from income 
from state-owned assets (e.g. below-price sales of property portfolios; selling of surplus 
equipment; below price privatizations)”. 
In general, military officers enrich themselves by receiving pay-offs in return for 
facilitating the interests of particular companies. “An open-door policy to foreign capital 
may also facilitate the acquisition of substantial support from multilateral and bilateral 
agencies. Well-placed military officers will be able to divert some of these funds to their 
own uses” (Ball, 1981). Finally, we develop two flow charts to provide a summary of the 
links between the military in politics and corruption. Following the above discussion, we 
isolate those links of the military and corruption that are relatively more conducive to 
explaining the relationship between the military in politics and corruption. The first chart 
shows that corruption is beneficial between groups in the presence of the military in 
politics while second chart provides a quick snapshot of the positive relationship between 
the military in politics and corruption. 
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 4. Data Description 
The ICRG (International Country Risk Guide) corruption index and corruption perception 
index (CPI) by Transparency International index are both are used in corruption studies. 
We prefer ICRG because most previous studies use it and the index covers a large 
number of countries and a long period of time. The comprehensive nature of the ICRG 
index gives it an edge over other available indices. The ICRG also has a high correlation 
with other indices that have been used in literature, such as the Transparency 
International and Business International (see Treisman, 2000 for more details) indices. 
We also carry out a simple correlation matrix for three alterative corruption indices over 
the period 1996-2207. The correlation matrix indicates that the correlation between the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) corruption index and the Transparency 
International (TI) corruption Index is 0.87 while the correlation between ICRG and 
World Bank (WB) corruption Index is 0.88. The correlation between TI and WB is 0.98 
and it implies that these indices are consistent, even although they are based on a 
subjective rating.  
The other variables used in this study are reported in Table 1. We average the data 
over a 5-year non-overlapping period, 1984-2007. In this way we have five observations, 
in most instances, for all of the countries in our sample. The 5 year average periods are: 
1984-88, 1989-93, 1994-98, 1999-03, 2004-07. In Table 2 we present some descriptive 
statistics of the data and Figure 1 shows the relationship between the military in politics 
and corruption for cross sectional and panel observations. In the first row of the figure the 
last two scatter plots contain panel observation while all other scatter plots contain cross-
sectional observations. This scatter plotting of the data confirm a positive relationship 
between the military in politics and corruption. There are outliers at a low level of 
military in politics while at higher levels military in politics outliers are absent (we 
address this issue in separate estimates for outliers and find a robust and positive 
relationship). Figure 2 simply also includes developing countries and this demonstrates a 
positive relationship as well.  
Figure 3 demonstrates the relationship between the military in politics and 
corruption over the period 1996-2007 for a large cross section of countries. This figure 
has been constructed to view the relationship between the military in politics and 
 
 
corruption using three alternative corruption indices that are extracted from the 
International Country Risk Guide, Transparency International and World Bank, 
respectively. It is evident from all sub parts of the figure that the relationship between the 
military in politics and corruption is positive irrespective of which corruption index is 
being used. 
Figure 4 shows a comparison of the military in politics and corruption across 
regions over the period 1984-2007. Two things are evident from this figure. First, both 
variables are positively associated. Second, in the case of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), 
East Asia & Pacific (EAP), Lat America & Caribbean (LAC), Middle East & North 
Africa (MNA) and South Asia (SA) this relationship is strongest. However, in the case of 
Europe & Central Asia (ECA) and Europe (EU) this relationship is not as strong and is 
weakened by the presence of outliers (it is also clear in the subsequent regional figures). 
Figure 5 contains a comparison of the military in politics and corruption across 
countries and within a region of East Asia & Pacific (EAP) and demonstrates a strong 
positive relationship. Figure 6 replicates the above comparison for Europe & Central Asia 
(ECA) and shows that the relationship between the military in politics and corruption is 
positive. However, in this region some outliers exist and these are Kazakhstan, Ukraine 
and Turkey. Figure 7 replicates the same comparison for Latin America & Caribbean 
(LAC) and depicts a positive relationship as well.  
Overall we conclude that the relationship between the military in politics and 
corruption is strongly positive across the countries, regions and within the region. This 
relationship also holds in sub samples, alternative corruption indices and different time 
periods. Although there are a few outliers, these outliers are too few to weaken the main 
results. 
 
5. The Model and Estimation Technique 
In this section we specify the estimating equation we use to capture the military – 
corruption links. The equation is based on the theoretical and empirical literatures on the 
causes of corruption. 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1 The Model 
In order to specify a corruption model, we follow the existing theoretical and empirical 
literatures on this topic. The recent growing literature on the sources of corruption builds 
on two bench mark studies by Treisman (2000) and La Porta et al. (1999). In developing 
a corruption model, the first step entails specifying the important control variables. The 
key control variable used in extant corruption models is economic development, 
generally measured by per capita income (PCY). There is consensus in the literature that 
nations at the top of the economic development ladder have a tendency to be the most 
clean (least corrupt), whilst nations at the bottom of ladder of economic development 
tend to be most corrupt. This suggests that the expected sign for PCY is negative. In the 
third step, the studies introduce few selective control variables that capture institutional, 
political and cultural dimensions of the corruption. We then introduce a set of other 
control variables which have now become standard, such as those that capture 
institutional, political and cultural dimensions of the corruption. The third step in our 
strategy is the introduce what we regard as a new source of corruption, that has not so far 
been quantified in corruptions studies, namely the role of military in politics. In particular 
we ask whether the involvement of the military in the political life of a country fosters 
corruption. In doing so, we collect case evidence from all over the world and provide a 
systematic documentation of the evidence of the military in politics and corruption. 
Having compiled our case evidence, we then systematically develop theoretical channels 
(links or considerations) to develop a base for empirical testing. Thus, the novelty of this 
study is not only the introduction of a hitherto missing source of corruption but also to 
systematically develop a theory linking military in politics and corruption by compiling 
evidence from around the world and scholarly arguments. In addition, while performing 
robustness analysis, we use a large number of control variables that have hitherto not 
been analyzed directly in literature. For instance, we use a variety of military related 
variables, such as military expenditure, military size, and arms trade. Similarly, we 
analyze institutional variables, such as religion in politics, investment profiles, internal 
conflict and external conflict. Given the above, our estimation equation is:  
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where Cit denotes corruption, MPit is an index for military involvement in politics and has 
a range between 0 to 6, Xit represents a set of control variables drawn from the existing 
corruption literature, Y is per capita income proxy for economic development/prosperity, 
uit is a country specific unobservable effect, vt is a time specific factor and εit is an i.i.d. 
disturbance term. The expected sign for our key variable of interest β1 is positive.  
 
5.2 Estimation Technique 
We now discuss the estimation procedure used for our different corruption specifications. 
In order to maximize the sample size and produce efficient parameter estimates, we 
follow the norm in the corruption literature we use a panel data base, that is our data base 
has both time-series and cross-sectional dimensions. As is now well known, in the 
context of the corruption literature Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is not an appropriate 
estimator since it suffers from the problem of omitted variable bias. For example, if a 
region, country or some group-specific factors affect corruption, the explanatory 
variables would capture the effects of these factors and estimates would not represent the 
true effect of the explanatory variables. To avoid this problem, Baltagi (2001) has 
proposed using fixed effect econometric techniques. However, in the presence of a lagged 
independent variable this technique also produces biased parameter estimates a Two 
Stage Least Square (2SLS) estimator is required which addresses both endogeniety and 
also the problem of omitted variables bias. In addition to the 2SLS estimator we also use 
alternative econometric techniques, such as Limited Information Maximum Likelihood 
(LIML), Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) and System-GMM. 
In this study, we rely mainly on the generalized method of Moments (GMM) 
estimation technique that has been developed for dynamic panel data analysis by Holtz-
Eakin et al. (1990), Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), and Blundell 
and Bond (1997). GMM controls for endogeneity of all the explanatory variables, allows 
for the inclusion of lagged dependent variables as regressors and accounts for unobserved 
country-specific effects. GMM estimation requires a sufficient instrument list and 
following the standard convention in the literature, the equations are estimated using 
lagged first differences as instruments. 
 
 
 6. Results and Discussions 
In this study, our estimation proceeds in the following steps: First, we present estimates 
where we condition only on our key variable of interest, namely the military in politics. 
Second, in addition to using a panel data set we also present purely cross sectional 
estimates based on our total sample of countries. We also use the purely cross sectional 
data because: for comparability purposes, since most of the existing literature is based on 
cross sectional studies; the variation in corruption is in fact dominant across countries 
rather than over time; it facilitates and extra robustness check of our results. Third, 
following the approach in other studies, and despite its deficiencies noted above, we also 
present results obtained using OLS econometric methods, before moving on to different 
econometric techniques which serve as robustness check and address the possible 
problem of endegeneity. Fourth, we introduce quantile regression analysis for military in 
politics in order to capture the distributional profile of the dependent variable, that is the 
corruption perception index. 
Fifth, in order to address the problem of endogeneity, we employ different 
instruments, such as distance from the equator, legal origin and own lags of variables. 
Sixth, our overall data sample contains all available countries contained in the ICRG data 
set, which is 146, but this size is reduced to 129 because the economic freedom and per 
capita income terms are not available for all countries. We split the sample into 
developed and developing countries and conduct a separate analysis for developing 
countries. Seventh, we divide the world into seven regions: East Asia & Pacific, Europe 
& Central Asia, Latin America & Caribbean, Middle East & North Africa, South Asia, 
Sub-Saharan Africa, Europe and Others. We prefer regional fixed effects over country 
fixed effects because variation in corruption comes across the regions for cultural and 
spacious reasons. 
Eighth, we introduce an extensive list of corruption determinants while 
performing sensitivity analysis. During such sensitivity analysis we focus on two things. 
First, we use existing determinants of corruption that have been widely analyzed in the 
literature. Second, we focus on those determinants of corruption which are controversial 
in the literature or which have received least attention in other empirical studies. Ninth, 
 
 
although corruption does not have a widely accepted functional form (in the same way 
that, say, consumption is a function of income, almost every study employ PCY as 
determinate of corruption. Further more the recent literature on the robust determinants of 
corruption (see, for example, Serra, 2006) has shown that the level of economic 
development/prosperity is a robust determinate of corruption. We also therefore employ 
the level of development as a determinant. Tenth, in order to control for the time factor, 
we also introduce five time dummies that are based on five year averages 1988 (1984-
88), 1993 (1989-93), 1998 (1994-98), 2003 (1999-03) and 2007. 
Eleventh, we systematically replicate our findings while controlling for outliers: 
(1) we exclude those countries which have full scale military involvement in politics; (2) 
Similarly we exclude those countries which have minimum scale military involvement in 
politics; (3) We exclude those countries which are the most corrupt nations; (4) Finally 
we exclude those nations which are the least corrupt. Our main finding of the positive 
relationship between the military in politics and corruption remains robust (these results 
are not reported here but are available from the authors on request). Twelfth and finally, 
we replicate our findings using two alternative corruption indices, the Transparency 
International corruption index and World Bank corruption index. Our main findings are 
robust to the use of the alternative corruption indices as well; however, we do not report 
these results. 
 Table 3 reports the cross sectional estimation results for corruption and military in 
politics for 130 countries, over the period 1984-2007, for a range of specifications. The 
parameter estimates for the military in politics is significant with the correct sign across 
the different specifications. The coefficient on military in politics ranges from 
approximately 0.24 to 0.13 in last two columns of the table. So on the basis of the largest 
estimate, a one unit increase in the standard deviation of military in politics produces a 
0.24 unit increase in the corruption index. It is noteworthy that this represents a much 
larger effect on corruption than any of the other variables. The value of the R2 is 
reasonably high and the p-value of the F-Stat is significant in all regressions. The level of 
economic development is consistently significant at the 1% level and that is consistent 
with earlier studies on corruption. 
 
 
 The economic freedom term also produces a significant coefficient at the 1% level 
of significance in all regressions, indicating that a higher degree of economic freedom 
reduce corruption, and this finding is consistent with a number of empirical studies, such 
as Treisman, 2000; Graeff and Mehlkop, 2003.  
 An important element that determines pervasiveness of corruption in the public 
sector of a country is ‘public morale’; that is, faith in country managers (authorities, 
policy makers). In nations where policies fail, or policy makers renege on their 
commitments and promises, the economy generates economic chaos that adversely 
affects economic morale. In this study we proxy this economic chaos with high inflation 
rates, since high inflation indicates macroeconomic imbalances. Furthermore, an 
important outcome of a high inflation rates is the redistribution of national wealth that 
may cause a further drop in the public morale. The significantly positive coefficient on 
inflation would seem to support this hypothesis and our result here is consistent with 
Paldam (2002), and Braun-Di Tella (2004).  
 As a sensitivity analysis and a robustness check on the main findings in Table 1, 
we report in Tables 4 and 5 the results from conditioning on additional factors, common 
law, remittances, a colonial term and the share of Protestants in the population. For 
example, in table 4 we replicate the results of table 3 by only including developing 
countries. As can be seen the findings for the sample of developing countries are similar 
to the full sample of developed and developing countries.  
The coefficient of military in politics remains in the range of 0.12 to 0.20 in our 
sensitivity analysis. Interestingly the highest value arises in the regression in which we 
control for the legal factor, common law, and the factor share of Protestants in the 
population. Of the additional conditioning variables all are correctly signed although the 
common law and colonial terms are not statistically significant.  
How may the significantly negative coefficient on the religion term be explained? 
Religion is seen to affect the pervasiveness of corruption in a country since it influences 
the social and cultural characteristics of a society. In principle, religion is thought to 
discourage corruption. However, its influence may vary between hierarchal religious 
systems (such as, Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy and Islam), and egalitarian religions. 
In countries where equalitarian religions are prominent there is evidence that they tend 
 
 
challenge the status quo more frequently. For example, protestant churches have 
traditionally been apart from government and inclined to monitor abuses of the 
government (Treisman, 2000). Furthermore, La Porta et al. (1999) argue that religion 
may influence the quality of legal system that in turn affects the extent of corruption. 
The sensitivity analyses reported in table 4 indicates that our main findings are 
robust with the only change being that government spending loses its level of 
significance when we control for either common law or protestant. The R2 statistic is also 
reasonably high in all regressions and the F-Stat is also significant in all regressions. 
 In Tables 6 to 8 we reexamine the basic specifications of Table 1 using both OLS 
and quantile regressions and different specification of the corruption model. Tables 6 to 8 
include three variables as benchmark: military in politics, PCY and economic freedom. 
The specification in Table 6 includes inflation excluding government spending while the 
specification in Table 8 includes both inflation and government spending. We use a 
quantile regression analysis here as an additional robustness check. The quantile 
regression analysis was been initially introduced by Koenker and Bassett (1978) and 
provides parameter estimates at multiple points in the conditional distribution of a 
dependent variable. Our quantile regression results are based upon 100 bootstrapping 
repetitions. In our estimations lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) indicate least corrupt countries 
while higher quantiles (e.g., Q0.9) indicate most corrupt countries. 
The estimates for OLS yield a base line of mean effects while quantile estimates 
provide conditional distribution of dependent of variable that is corruption. In both the 
OLS and quantile regressions, greater economic prosperity in a country is seen to lower 
corruption, which is consistent with the findings of several studies on the causes of 
corruption (see Serra, 2006). The results show that both political freedom and economic 
freedom help in reducing corruption. A larger government may devote more resources to 
strengthen the checks and balances and as a result reduce corruption. In the same way, a 
high quality bureaucracy is also helpful in reducing corruption. 
The effect of the military in politics on corruption is always positive, generating 
high corruption indexes; it means military in politics is correlated with more corruption. 
The military in politics substantially fosters corruption. This effect is more pronounced in 
the half of the conditional distribution; i.e., among the mean/median corrupt countries. 
 
 
 The analysis of conditional distribution of our dependent variable (corruption) 
supports our main finding in two ways. First, main results of the study are not weakened 
by the observations lying in both tails of the distribution. Second, existing levels of 
corruption are not as important as military in politics matters in increasing existing levels 
of corruption. 
 The effect of economic freedom is nearly always negative, causing lower indexes; 
i.e., economic freedom is correlated with less corruption. However, the effect of inflation 
is more significant at lower quantiles as compared to higher quintiles, and this finding 
remains consistent even after controlling for government spending. 
 OLS estimates suggest inflation matters a lot in increasing corruption, but the 
quantile regression results do not uniformly confirm this. Specifically, controlling for 
government consumption, inflation substantially increases corruption, but only in the 
bottom bottom-half of the conditional distribution (among the less/least corrupt). As 
inflation increase in the less/least corrupt nations, ceteris paribus, they experience an 
increase in corruption. 
 Though inflation is the potential source of corruption in the OLS regression, its 
effect is not consistent in the quantile regression. Its effect is more significant in the 
lower part of the distribution; that is inflation promotes corruption in less and least 
corrupt nations while its s effect is positive in top part of distribution but not significant. 
The effect of government consumption is strongest at the median/mean of the 
conditional distribution. While comparing the tails of the distribution, this effect is 
significant in the upper most quantile, suggesting that increasing the size of government 
in most corrupt nations may reduce corruption. 
In Table 9 we present the results for military in politics and corruption after 
controlling for regional effects. In the literature, corruption is considered as a regional 
phenomenon meaning that corruption varies more across regions (for cultural reasons) 
compared to variations within a region (see Paldam, 2002). In order to capture regional 
variations (heterogeneity) we introduce regional dummy variables to assess whether our 
main findings are robust to inclusion of regional specific dummy variables. The estimated 
coefficients of the dummy variables for Europe & Central Asia (ECA) and Latin America 
& Caribbean (LAC) are each positive and statistically highly significant. The results 
 
 
indicate that ECA and LAC regions are 0.7 and 0.6 points, respectively, more corrupt 
than the average for all countries. The dummy variables for all other regions are 
insignificant with positive signs, except East Asia and Pacific which is negatively signed. 
Our results are robust to inclusion of regional controls. The coefficient on military in 
politics fluctuates between 0.12 and 0.15 and it is highly significant with the correct sign 
in all columns of the table. The effect of government spending is negative and significant 
but it is not robust. The results show that the positive effect of inflation on corruption is 
robustly significant.  
Table 10 replicates the finding of Table 9 for a restricted sample of developing 
countries. The coefficient on military in politics slightly increases and fluctuates between 
0.13 and 0.17. However, the direction of the link and level of significance are robust in 
the restricted sample as well. The effect of government spending is consistently negative 
and significant in the case of developing world which has been also confirmed from the 
quantile analysis that the role of government in fighting against corruption in more 
corrupt countries is pronounced. In the case of inflation results are opposite between 
sample. In case of whole sample, the positive effect of the inflation on corruption is 
robust while in the case of restricted sample level of significance slightly drops while the 
direction of link remains the same.  
 
7. Conclusion  
In recent years attention has focused on the importance of the elimination of global 
corruption. For example, international organizations such as the United Nations and 
World Bank have been advocating anti-corruption measure, such as greater transparency 
in government deals and contracts. Additionally, individual governments have been 
improving and strengthening the rule of law to monitor and punish corrupt officials. 
Despite these initiatives, policy makers often face the challenge of isolating the various 
avenues of corruption because of a lack of understanding of the various causes of 
corruption. This is because some institutional, political and cultural effects on corruption 
are very subtle and hard to quantify. This study contributes to our understanding of the 
causes of corruption by identifying a novel avenue of corruption, namely military 
participation in politics. This source of corruption is extremely important for both 
 
 
academic researchers and policy makers as it stems from the institutional, cultural and 
political settings of a society which are usually hard to quantify. 
We use both cross sectional and panel data for a large set of countries over a 
relatively long time period. To identify a relationship between military involvement in 
politics and corruption, we draw extensively on existing case studies, scholarly 
arguments, and historical evidence from around the world. Having done this, we 
systematically develop a theory which links the military, government and corruption and 
we test this empirically. The theoretical and empirical analysis of this study is unique 
because it analyzes the relationship between the military in politics and corruption and 
this has not hitherto been addressed in the literature. The analysis shows that the presence 
of the military in politics significantly adds to corruption in a society. In particular, the 
results reveal that a one standard deviation increase in the presence of military in politics 
leads to a 0.22 unit increase in corruption index. This effect arises because the presence 
of the military in politics expands the role of military officials in government and they 
usually hold the key to bureaucratic and administrative positions in the government 
machinery, controlling the scarce resources of the military sector, sectors related to 
military and other non productive activities. These sectors are least accountable to the 
public and so public resources can be exploited for private gain, in the control of 
elections, the distortion of market systems, and these can all cause a rise in corruption. 
Although even when the military are involved in the political process, resources are 
devoted to infrastructure and other development projects, the hidden motive behind such 
projects is the maximization of rent, for example, with MNCs competing for business 
contracts through bribes instead of fair market competition. 
Our study is also novel because it evaluates the conditional distribution of the 
military in politics and corruption using a quantile regression analysis. The results reveal 
that the effect of military in politics on corruption is always positive, causing high 
corruption indexes: the military in politics substantially fosters corruption. This effect is 
more pronounced in the half of the conditional distribution; i.e., among the mean/median 
corrupt countries. The analysis of the conditional distribution of our dependent variable 
(corruption) supports our main finding in two ways. First, the main results of the study 
are not weakened by the observations in both tails of the distribution. Second, existing 
 
 
levels of corruption are not as important as military in politics for increasing existing 
levels of corruption: the positive relationship between the military in politics is consistent 
through out the scale of corruption.  
Another important feature of our analysis of the causes of corruption is that while 
considering a wide set of corruption sources we particularly focus on a key set of 
determinants of corruption, such as government spending and inflation. The results show 
that the effect of government spending is significantly and robustly negative. However, in 
quantile regressions, the effect of government consumption is strongest at the 
median/mean of the conditional distribution. While comparing tails of the distribution, 
this effect is significant in the upper most quantile, suggesting that increasing the size of 
government in the most corrupt nations may reduce corruption. In the case of inflation, 
OLS estimates suggest inflation matters a lot in increasing corruption, but quantile 
regression results do not uniformly confirm this. Specifically, controlling for government 
consumption, inflation substantially increases corruption, but only in the bottom bottom-
half of the conditional distribution (among the less/least corrupt). As inflation increase in 
the less/least corrupt nations, ceteris paribus, they experience an increase in corruption.  
 
 
 
Table 1: Description of Variables 
Variable  Definitions Sources 
Per capita real GDP GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$).  World Bank database World Bank (2008) 
Trade Liberalization It is the sum of exports and imports as a share of real 
GDP. Data on exports, imports and real GDP are in the 
form of annual averages between survey years. 
World Bank database World Bank (2008) 
Corruption  ICRG corruption index rescaled from 0 (absence of 
corruption) to 6 (highest corruption). 
International Country Risk Guide, PRS group. 
Corruption  Transparency International corruption index rescaled 
from 0 (absence of corruption) to 10 (highest 
corruption). 
Transparency International  
Corruption  World Bank corruption index rescaled from -2.5 
(absence of corruption) to 2.5 (highest corruption). 
World Bank  
Democracy  ICRG index 0-6 scale; where 6 indicate high degree of 
democracy. 
International Country Risk Guide, PRS group. 
Military in Politics ICRG index rescaled 0-6; higher risk ratings (6) indicate 
a greater degree of military participation in politics and a 
higher level of political risk. 
International Country Risk Guide, PRS group. 
Religion in Politics ICRG index 0-6 scale: higher ratings are given to 
countries where religious tensions are minimal. 
International Country Risk Guide, PRS group. 
Ethnic Tensions ICRG index 0-6 scale; higher ratings are given to 
countries where tensions are minimal. 
International Country Risk Guide, PRS group. 
Rule of Law ICRG index 0-6 scale; where 6 indicate high degree of 
law and order. 
International Country Risk Guide, PRS group. 
Bureaucracy 
Quality 
ICRG index 0-4 scale; where 4 indicate high degree of 
law and order. 
International Country Risk Guide, PRS group. 
Government 
Stability 
ICRG index 0-12 scale; where 0 indicates very high risk 
and 12 indicates very low risk. 
International Country Risk Guide, PRS group. 
Socioeconomic 
Conditions 
ICRG index 0-12 scale; where 0 indicates very high risk 
and 12 indicates very low risk. 
International Country Risk Guide, PRS group. 
Investment Profiles ICRG index 0-12 scale; where 0 indicates very high risk 
and 12 indicates very low risk. 
International Country Risk Guide, PRS group. 
Internal Conflict ICRG index 0-12 scale; where 0 indicates very high risk 
and 12 indicates very low risk. 
International Country Risk Guide, PRS group. 
External Conflict ICRG index 0-12 scale; where 0 indicates very high risk 
and 12 indicates very low risk. 
International Country Risk Guide, PRS group. 
Economic Freedom Freedom House data. Index rescaled 0 (low economic 
freedom)-7 (high economic freedom) 
Fraser Institute. 
Inflation  Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) World Bank database World Bank (2008) 
Government 
Spending  
General government final consumption expenditure (% 
of GDP) 
World Bank database World Bank (2008) 
Remittances  Workers' remittances and compensation of employees, 
received (% of GDP) 
World Bank database World Bank (2008) 
Military Spending  Military expenditure (% of GDP) World Bank database World Bank (2008) 
Arm Trade Arms exports plus arms imports (constant 1990 US$) World Bank database World Bank (2008) 
Urbanization  Urban Population  World Bank database World Bank (2008) 
British Colony A dummy variable that is 1 for British Colony  http://flagspot.net/flags/gb-colon.html 
Common Law Binary variable which equals 1if the country’s company 
law or commercial code is English common law, equals 
0 otherwise 
Treisman (2000) 
Protestant  Share of Protestants in 1980 Treisman (2000) 
British  British legal origin La Porta et al. (1997) 
 
 
French French legal origin  La Porta et al. (1997) 
Scandinavian  Scandinavian legal origin  La Porta et al. (1997) 
Socialist Socialist legal origin  La Porta et al. (1997) 
Germany  Germany legal origin La Porta et al. (1997) 
Equator  Distance from equator La Porta et al. (1997) 
 
Table 2: Summary Statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Corruption 675 2.932585 1.322528 -.0333328 6 
Per Capita Income 653 6949.03 9566.997 84.89059 53800.33 
Remittances 523 2.847373 4.769296 .0018351 42.54366 
Openness 644 78.72449 47.99039 2.566213 442.2996 
Government 635 16.04497 6.173756 4.05478 46.35652 
Democracy 675 3.6823 1.607773 0 6 
Economic Freedom 673 4.403913 1.942066 1 7 
Urbanization 693 1.81e+07 4.72e+07 91250.07 5.34e+08 
Military in Politics 675 3.715646 1.785895 0 6.033333 
Bureaucracy Quality 675 2.139725 1.171961 0 4 
Socio Economic 675 5.68345 2.131201 .0208333 10.775 
Government Stability 675 7.566057 2.006066 1.466667 11.5 
Internal conflict 675 8.765272 2.564226 .0333333 12 
External conflict 675 9.604507 2.118613 0 12 
Investment Profiles 675 7.057228 2.339163 .8000001 12 
Religion in Politics 675 4.591332 1.320474 0 6 
Rule of Law 675 3.667232 1.45727 .55 6 
Ethno linguistic 675 3.932934 1.427448 0 6 
Consumer P Index 621 41152.82 1023276 7.20e-10 2.55e+07 
Inflation 615 74.31995 434.1466 -4.207125 6523.051 
Net Users  554 9.167496 16.75737 0 82.23592 
Military Sp/Government 296 10.34746 9.270922 0 53.5601 
Military Sp/GDP 583 2.785165 3.350683 0 43.7737 
Arm exports 276 4.20e+08 1.52e+09 0 1.27e+10 
Aram imports 573 2.06e+08 4.05e+08 0 3.70e+09 
Arm Trade 259 7.99e+08 1.63e+09 8666667 1.33e+10 
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Table 3: Corruption and Military in Politics: Cross Sectional (CS) Estimation (I) 
Variables  Dependent Variable: Corruption 
Military in 
Politics 
0.48 
(10.74)* 
0.26 
(5.13)* 
0.15 
(2.70)* 
0.12 
(1.96)* 
0.12 
(2.09)** 
PCY  -0.000 
(-7.09)* 
-0.000 
(-6.40)* 
-0.000 
(-5.99)* 
-0.000 
(-6.20)* 
Economic 
Freedom 
  -0.19 
(-4.18)* 
-0.21 
(-4.88)* 
-0.18 
(-3.97)* 
Government 
Spending 
   -0.02 
(-1.62)*** 
-0.02 
(-1.88)*** 
Inflation     0.000 
(2.18)** 
R 0.45 0.60 0.65 0.65 0.68 
Adj. R  0.44 0.59 0.64 0.64 0.67 
F  115.25 
(0.000) 
98.57 
(0.000) 
80.06 
(0.000) 
58.54 
(0.000) 
52.28 
(0.000) 
Observations  146 135 132 130 128 
*, **, and *** denote statistically significant at the 1 %, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
Table 4: Corruption and Military in Politics: CS Estimation (II) for Developing 
Countries 
Variables  Dependent Variable: Corruption 
Military in 
Politics 
0.21 
(4.65)* 
0.24 
(5. 41)* 
0.18 
(3.60)* 
0.134 
(2.47)* 
0.133 
(2.47)* 
Economic 
Prosperity 
 -0.114 
(-3.52)* 
-0.117 
(-3.50)* 
-0.127 
(-3.83)* 
-0.108 
(-3.16)* 
Economic 
Freedom 
  -0.086 
(-1.76)* 
-0.10 
(-1.98)* 
-0.104 
(-2.01)** 
Government 
Spending 
   -0.024 
(-1.98)*** 
-0.027 
(-2.27)*** 
Inflation     0.0005 
(1.73)*** 
R 0.18 0.29 0.30 0.32 0.36 
Adj. R 0.17 0.27 0.27 0.29 0.32 
F  21.64 
(0.000) 
18.65 
(0.000) 
12.67 
(0.000) 
10.10 
(0.000) 
9.34 
(0.000) 
Observations  99 96 94 92 89 
*, **, and *** denote statistically significant at the 1 %, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Corruption and Military in Politics: CS Estimation (III): Sensitivity 
Analysis 
Variables  Dependent Variable: Corruption 
Military in 
Politics 
0.12 
(1.96)* 
0.12 
(2.09)** 
0.11 
(2.03)** 
0.12 
(1.94)** 
0.21 
(3.25)* 
0.20 
(3.10)* 
PCY -0.000 
(-5.99)* 
-0.000 
(-6.20)* 
-0.000 
(-7.46)* 
-0.000 
(-5.80)* 
-0.000 
(-5.95)* 
-0.000 
(-5.63)* 
Economic 
Freedom 
-0.21 
(-4.88)* 
-0.18 
(-3.97)* 
-0.096 
(-1.84)*** 
-0.22 
(-4.54)* 
-0.15 
(-2.72)* 
-0.14 
(-2.59)* 
Government 
Spending 
-0.02 
(-1.62)*** 
-0.02 
(-1.88)*** 
-0.03 
(-2.06)** 
-0.02 
(-1.65)*** 
-0.02 
(-1.56) 
-0.01 
(-1.08) 
Inflation  0.000 
(2.18)** 
    
Remittances    0.02 
(1.60)*** 
   
British 
Colony 
   0.025 
(0.18) 
  
Common 
law 
    0.01 
(0.09) 
 
Protestant      -0.007 
(-2.16)** 
R 0.65 0.68 0.71 0.71 0.75 0.77 
Adj. R 0.64 0.67 0.70 0.70 0.74 0.76 
F  58.54 
(0.000) 
52.28 
(0.000) 
55.11 
(0.000) 
55.11 
(0.000) 
52.64 
(0.000) 
56.46 
(0.000) 
Observations  130 128 119 119 91 91 
Note: *, **, and *** denote statistically significant at the 1 %, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Corruption and Military in Politics: OLS vs. Quintile Regression: 
specification 1 
Variables  OLS Q0.1 Q0.25 Q0.50 Q0.75 Q0.9 
Military in 
Politics 
0.16 
(2.89)* 
0.064 
(0.76) 
0.20 
(2.78)* 
0.20 
(2.88)* 
0.09 
(1.08) 
0.13 
(1.12) 
PCY -0.000 
(-6.65)* 
-0.000 
(-4.97)* 
-0.000 
(-4.59)* 
-0.000 
(-4.38)* 
-0.000 
(-3.34)* 
-0.000 
(-2.66)* 
Economic 
Freedom  
-0.17 
(-3.68)* 
-0.29 
(-3.31)* 
-0.29 
(-2.30)* 
-0.14 
(-2.42)* 
-0.20 
(-2.48)* 
-0.14 
(-1.20)* 
Inflation 0.0006 
(-1.99)* 
0.0009 
(2.16)* 
0.0007 
(1.96)** 
0.0008 
(1.54) 
0.0006 
(1.15) 
0.0004 
(0.90) 
R 0.68 0.56 0.53 0.41 0.32 0.29 
Adj. R 0.67      
F  65.29 
(0.000) 
42.69 
(0.000) 
26.00 
(0.000) 
43.03 
(0.000) 
17.96 
(0.000) 
6.97 
(0.000) 
Observations  129 129 129 129 129 129 
Notes: Dependent Variable is corruption perception index from ICRG 
Regressions include 120-122 observations of country level data. 
Quantile regression results are based upon 100 bootstrapping repetitions. 
Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify less corrupt nations. 
All regressions include an intercept term but the results are not reported. 
F-statistics and associated p-values are reported for the test of all slope parameters jointly equal to zero. 
The t-statistics are given in parentheses (*), (**), and (***) indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 
10% levels respectively   
 
 
Table 7: Corruption and Military in Politics (CS): OLS vs. Quintile Regression: 
Specification 2 
Variables  OLS Q0.1 Q0.25 Q0.50 Q0.75 Q0.9 
Military in 
Politics 
0.15 
(2.70)* 
0.061 
(0.67) 
0.19 
(2.78)* 
0.20 
(3.83)* 
0.16 
(1.74)*** 
0.04 
(0.40) 
PCY -0.000 
(-6.40)* 
-0.000 
(-4.63)* 
-0.000 
(-5.00)* 
-0.000 
(-5.78)* 
-0.000 
(-2.48)* 
-0.000 
(-2.52)* 
Economic 
Freedom 
-0.39 
(-4.18) 
-0.24 
(-2.65) 
-0.12 
(-2.36) 
-0.15 
(-2.71) 
-0.19 
(-2.13) 
-0.29 
(-2.86) 
R 0.65 0.54 0.50 0.39 0.29 0.27 
Adj. R 0.64      
F  80.06 48.69 
(0.000) 
38.28 
(0.000) 
77.81 
(0.000) 
15.97 
(0.000) 
1014 
(0.000) 
Observations  132 132 132 132 132 132 
Notes: Dependent Variable is corruption perception index from ICRG 
Regressions include 120-122 observations of country level data. 
Quantile regression results are based upon 100 bootstrapping repetitions. 
Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify less corrupt nations. 
All regressions include an intercept term but the results are not reported. 
F-statistics and associated p-values are reported for the test of all slope parameters jointly equal to zero. 
The t-statistics are given in parentheses (*), (**), and (***) indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 
10% levels respectively   
 
 
Table 8: Corruption and Military in Politics (CS): OLS vs. Quintile Regression: 
Specification 3 
Variables  OLS Q0.1 Q0.25 Q0.50 Q0.75 Q0.9 
Military in 
Politics 
0.12 
(2.09)* 
0.11 
(1.09) 
0.14 
(2.17)** 
0.20 
(2.71)** 
0.13 
(1.26) 
0.002 
(0.02) 
PCY -0.000 
(-6.20)* 
-0.000 
(-2.97)* 
-0.000 
(-5.88)* 
-0.000 
(-4.41)* 
-0.000 
(-3.05)* 
-0.000 
(-2.00)** 
Economic 
Freedom 
-0.18 
(-3.97)* 
-0.21 
(-2.58)* 
-0.21 
(-1.71)***
-0.14 
(-1.83)*** 
-0.14 
(-2.15)** 
-0.27 
(-2.59)** 
Inflation 0.0007 
(2.18)** 
0.0009 
(3.07)* 
0.0008 
(2.48)* 
0.0008 
(1.39) 
0.0005 
(0.91) 
0.0002 
(0.43) 
Government 
Spending 
-0.022 
(-1.88)*** 
-0.025 
(-0.58) 
-0.023 
(-1.60) 
-0.01 
(-0.89) 
-0.023 
(-1.26) 
-0.04 
(-1.72)*** 
R 0.68 0.60 0.54 0.52 0.32 0.31 
Adj. R 0.67      
F  52.88 
(0.000) 
42.05 
(0.000) 
45.50 
(0.000) 
30.32 
(0.000) 
13.83 
(0.000) 
6.91 
(0.000) 
Observations  128 128 128 128 128 128 
Notes: Dependent Variable is corruption perception index from ICRG 
Regressions include 120-122 observations of country level data. 
Quantile regression results are based upon 100 bootstrapping repetitions. 
Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify less corrupt nations. 
All regressions include an intercept term but the results are not reported. 
F-statistics and associated p-values are reported for the test of all slope parameters jointly equal to zero. 
The t-statistics are given in parentheses (*), (**), and (***) indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 
10% levels respectively   
 
 
Table 9: Corruption and Military in Politics: CS Estimation (IV): Regional Effects 
Variables  Dependent Variable: Corruption 
Military in 
Politics 
0.12 
(2.09)** 
0.12 
(2.03)** 
0.163 
(2.69)* 
0.148 
(2.50)* 
0.156 
(2.62)* 
0.143 
(2.41)* 
0.131 
(2.17)** 
PCY -0.000 
(-6.20)* 
-0.000 
(-6.11)* 
-0.000 
(-5.43)* 
-0.000 
(-4.79)* 
-0.000 
(-4.93)* 
-0.000 
(-4.81)* 
-0.000 
(-4.49)* 
Economic 
Freedom 
-0.18 
(-3.97)* 
-0.19 
(-3.94)* 
-0.17 
(-3.62)* 
-0.22 
(-4.40)* 
-0.18 
(-3.28)* 
-0.20 
(-3.62)* 
-0.20 
(-3.27)* 
Government 
Spending 
-0.02 
(-1.88)*** 
-0.02 
(-1.90)*** 
-0.02 
(-1.68)*** 
-0.014 
(-1.28) 
-0.017 
(-1.42) 
-0.019 
(-1.6)*** 
-0.019 
(-1.6)*** 
Inflation 0.000 
(2.18)** 
0.000 
(2.13)** 
0.000 
(1.84)*** 
0.000 
(1.62)*** 
0.000 
(1.83)*** 
0.000 
(1.74)*** 
0.000 
(1.65)*** 
East Asia & 
Pacific 
 -0.08 
(-0.035) 
-0.014 
(-0.06) 
0.062 
(0.29) 
0.13 
(0.57) 
  
Europe & 
Central Asia 
  0.438 
(2.13)** 
0.555 
(2.70)** 
0.60 
(2.87)** 
0.59 
(2.91)** 
0.72 
(2.94)** 
Lat America & 
Caribbean 
   0.452 
(2.68)* 
0.451 
(2.68)* 
0.468 
(2.76)* 
0.60 
(2.60)* 
Middle East & 
North Africa 
    0.27 
(1.23) 
0.26 
(1.21) 
0.39 
(1.54) 
South Asia 
 
     0.30 
(0.97) 
0.45 
(1.30) 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
      0.21 
(1.00) 
Europe        0.083 
(1.37) 
R 0.68 0.68 0.70 0.71 0.72 0.72 0.72 
Adj. R 0.67 0.67 0.68 0.69 0.70 0.70 0.70 
F  52.28 
(0.000) 
43.77 
(0.000) 
39.26 
(0.000) 
37.02 
(0.000) 
33.22 
(0.000) 
33.46 
(0.000) 
27.23 
(0.000) 
Observations  128 128 128 128 128 128 128 
Note: *, **, and *** denote statistically significant at the 1 %, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Table 10: Corruption and Military in Politics: CS Estimation (V): Regional Effects 
in Developing Countries  
Variables  Dependent Variable: Corruption 
Military in 
Politics 
0.133 
(2.47)* 
0.137 
(2.53)* 
0.171 
(2.91)* 
0.171 
(2.82)* 
0.159 
(2.62)* 
0.160 
(2.70)* 
0.153 
(2.51)* 
Economic 
Prosperity 
-0.108 
(-3.16)* 
-0.119 
(-3.27)* 
-0.105 
(-2.81)* 
-0.105 
 (-2.77)* 
-0.125 
(-3.12)* 
-0.122 
(-3.10)* 
-0.124 
(-3.09)* 
Economic 
Freedom 
-0.104 
(-2.01)** 
-0.101 
(-1.95)** 
-0.092 
(-1.77)*** 
-0.09 
(-1.62)*** 
-0.101 
(-1.6)*** 
-0.105 
(-2.01)** 
-0.142 
(-2.00)** 
Government 
Spending 
0.027 
(2.27)*** 
-0.026 
(-2.15)** 
-0.03 
(-2.00)** 
-0.03 
(-1.97)** 
-0.025 
(-2.06)** 
-0.027 
(-2.19)** 
-0.0228 
(-1.77)*** 
Inflation 0.0005 
(1.73)*** 
0.0005 
(1.73)*** 
0.0005 
(1.7)*** 
0.000 
(1.63)*** 
0.0004 
(1.46) 
0.0004 
(1.5) 
0.0004 
(1.32) 
East Asia & 
Pacific 
 0.204 
(0.89) 
0.223 
(0.98) 
0.221 
(0.94) 
0.27 
(1.02) 
0.28 
(1.22) 
0.87 
(1.57) 
Europe & 
Central Asia 
  0.276 
(1.43) 
0.274 
(1.39) 
0.257 
(1.17) 
0.25 
(1.12) 
0.68 
(1.22) 
Lat America & 
Caribbean 
   0.000 
(0.000) 
  0.68 
(1.22) 
Middle East & 
North Africa 
   -0.009 
(-0.04) 
0.013 
(0.05) 
 0.555 
(1.08) 
South Asia 
 
    0.42 
(1.38) 
0.43 
(1.56) 
1.03 
(1.78)*** 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
    -0.036 
(-0.20) 
 0.552 
(1.08) 
Europe       0.375 
(0.89) 
0.71 
(1.40) 
R 0.36 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.40 0.41 0.42 
Adj. R 0.32 0.32 0.33 0.32 0.33 0.34 0.33 
F  9.34 
(0.000) 
7.90 
(0.000) 
7.15 
(0.000) 
6.18 
(0.000) 
5.21 
(0.000) 
6.00 
(0.000) 
4.55 
(0.000) 
Observations  89 89 89 89 89 89 89 
Note: *, **, and *** denote statistically significant at the 1 %, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 Table 11: Corruption and Military in Politics: Panel Estimation 
Variables  Dependent Variable: Corruption 
Military in 
Politics 
0.44 
(19.08)* 
0.27 
(9.93)* 
0.18 
(6.03)* 
0.098 
(3.21)* 
0.074 
(2.34)** 
0.15 
(-4.73)** 
PCY  -0.000 
(-11.00)* 
-0.000 
(-9.92)* 
-0.000 
(-5.11)* 
-0.000 
(-4.95)* 
-0.000 
(-9.21)* 
Democracy    -0.21 
(-6.75)* 
-0.21 
(-4.26)* 
-0.14 
(-4.51)* 
-0.22 
(-6.88)* 
Bureaucracy 
Quality 
   -0.41 
(-7.58)* 
-0.39 
(-6.92)* 
- 
Government 
Spending 
    -0.02 
(-2.94)* 
-0.03 
(-3.78)* 
R 0.35 0.46 0.50 0.54 0.54 0.54 
Adj. R 0.35 0.46 0.49 0.53 0.53 0.53 
F  364.11 
(0.000) 
263.47 
(0.000) 
203.48 
(0.000) 
180.88 
(0.000) 
137.58 
(0.000) 
148.34 
(0.000) 
Observations  675 675 622 622 602 602 
Note: *, **, and *** denote statistically significant at the 1 %, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
Table 12: Corruption and Military in Politics: Panel Estimation: Sensitivity 
Analysis (I) 
Variables  Dependent Variable: Corruption 
Military in 
Politics 
0.26 
(8.93)* 
0.16 
(5.06)* 
0.27 
(9.22)* 
0.21 
(6.23)* 
0.23 
(7.24)* 
0.31 
(10.39)* 
0.16 
(5.18)* 
0.22 
(7.33)* 
PCY -0.000 
(-10.98)* 
-0.000 
(-9.60)* 
-0.000 
(-11.29)* 
-0.000 
(-10.50)* 
-0.000 
(-10.98)*
-0.000 
(-12.43)* 
-0.000 
(-7.03)* 
-0.000 
(-10.78)* 
Government 
Spending 
-0.03 
(-3.90)* 
-0.03 
(-4.33)* 
-0.03 
(-3.71)* 
-0.03 
(-4.14)* 
-0.03 
(-4.33)* 
-0.02 
(-3.48)* 
-0.02 
(-3.47)* 
-0.03 
(-4.20)* 
Openness 0.004 
(4.36)* 
0.003 
(3.13) 
0.003 
(3.83)* 
0.004 
(4.75)* 
0.004 
(4.52)* 
0.003 
(3.26)* 
0.004 
(4.47)* 
0.004 
(4.35)* 
Democracy   -0.20 
(-6.31)* 
      
Government 
Stability 
  0.06 
(2.58)* 
     
Internal 
Conflict 
   -0.06 
(-2.71)* 
    
External 
Conflict 
    -0.06 
(-2.67)* 
   
Investment 
Profiles 
     0.12 
(5.58)* 
  
Rule of Law        -0.28 
(-7.19)* 
 
Religion in 
Politics 
       -0.13 
(-3.84)* 
R 0.48 0.51 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.52 0.50 0.49 
Adj. R 0.47 0.51 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.51 0.50 0.49 
F  135.45 
(0.000) 
123.41 
(0.000) 
110.72 
(0.000) 
110.98 
(0.000) 
110.90 
(0.000) 
127.98 
(0.000) 
120.07 
(0.000) 
113.82 
(0.000) 
Observations  602 598 598 598 598 598 598 598 
Note: *, **, and *** denote statistically significant at the 1 %, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
Table 13: Corruption and Military in Politics: Panel Estimation: Sensitivity 
Analysis (II) 
Variables  Dependent Variable: Corruption 
Military in 
Politics 
0.26 
(8.93)* 
0.23 
(7.68)* 
0.15 
(3.44)* 
0.26 
(9.03)* 
0.20 
(6.96)* 
0.37 
(6.50)* 
0.26 
(8.91)* 
0.26 
(9.82)* 
PCY -0.000 
(-10.98)* 
-0.000 
(-10.5)* 
-0.000 
(-10.11)* 
-0.000 
(-11.13)* 
-0.000 
(-11.82)*
-0.000 
(-6.48)* 
-0.000 
(-11.70)* 
-0.000 
(-12.75)* 
Government 
Spending 
-0.03 
(-3.90)* 
-0.03 
(-4.11)* 
-0.03 
(-3.09)* 
-0.03 
(-3.74)* 
-0.04 
(-5.08)* 
-0.04 
(-3.11)* 
-0.03 
(-3.38)* 
-0.02 
(-2.98)* 
Openness 0.004 
(4.36)* 
0.004 
(4.33)* 
0.003 
(2.32)* 
0.004 
(4.70)* 
0.004 
(4.06)* 
0.005 
(3.34)* 
0.003 
(3.89)* 
0.002 
(2.44)* 
Ethnic 
Tensions 
 -0.08 
(-2.61)* 
      
Military 
Spending 
  0.012 
(1.94)** 
     
Urbanization     0.000  
(1.86)***
    
Remittances     0.021 
(2.45)* 
   
Arm Trade      0.000 
(1.53) 
  
Inflation       0.0002 
(2.36)* 
 
Yr1993        -0.12 
(-1.04)* 
Yr1998        -0.06 
(-0.48) 
Yr2003        0.60 
(5.18)* 
Yr2007        0.92 
(7.86)* 
R 0.48 0.48 0.54 0.48 0.55 0.53 0.52 0.58 
Adj. R 0.47 0.48 0.53 0.47 0.54 0.52 0.52 0.57 
F  135.45 
(0.000) 
110.78 
(0.000) 
63.95 
(0.000) 
109.50 
(0.000) 
120.14 
(0.000) 
50.88 
(0.000) 
121.42 
(0.000) 
99.23 
(0.000) 
Observations  602 598 598 598 501 230 566 598 
Note: *, **, and *** denote statistically significant at the 1 %, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
Table 14: Corruption and Military in Politics: Panel Estimation using Random 
Effects: Sensitivity Analysis (I) 
Variables  Dependent Variable: Corruption 
Military in 
Politics 
0.24 
(7.36)* 
0.22 
(6.07)* 
0.26 
(7.83)* 
0.22 
(5.81)* 
0.22 
(6.50)* 
0.30 
(9.41)* 
0.16 
(4.70)* 
0.21 
(6.01)* 
PCY -0.000 
(-5.13)* 
-0.000 
(-5.52)* 
-0.000 
(-5.39)* 
-0.000 
(-5.13)* 
-0.000 
(-5.33)* 
-0.000 
(-7.41)* 
-0.000 
(-3.55)* 
-0.000 
(-4.98)* 
Government 
Spending 
-0.036 
(-4.25)* 
-0.036 
(-4.35)* 
-0.03 
(-3.66)* 
-0.04 
(-4.42)* 
-0.04 
(-4.56)* 
-0.03 
(-2.93)* 
-0.04 
(-4.52)* 
-0.04 
(-4.35)* 
Openness 0.006 
(5.36)* 
0.006 
(5.06) 
0.005 
(4.49)* 
0.007 
(5.54)* 
0.006 
(5.55)* 
0.004 
(3.24)* 
0.006 
(5.50)* 
0.006 
(5.43)* 
Democracy   -0.07 
(-2.03)** 
      
Government 
Stability 
  0.063 
(3.58)* 
     
Internal 
Conflict 
   -0.03 
(-
1.63)*** 
    
External 
Conflict 
    -0.04 
(-2.02)**
   
Investment 
Profiles 
     0.155 
(8.93)* 
  
Rule of Law        -0.22 
(-5.65)* 
 
Religion in 
Politics 
       -0.13 
(-3.18)* 
RB 0.53 0.57 0.55 0.54 0.54 0.55 0.57 0.54 
RO 0.45 0.48 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.49 0.50 0.46 
Observations  602 598 598 598 598 598 598 598 
Note: *, **, and *** denote statistically significant at the 1 %, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
Table 15: Corruption and Military in Politics: Panel Estimation using Random 
Effects: Sensitivity Analysis (II) 
Variables  Dependent Variable: Corruption 
Military in 
Politics 
0.24 
(7.36)* 
0.22 
(6.21)* 
0.16 
(3.24)* 
0.24 
(7.38)* 
0.20 
(5.93)* 
0.25 
(7.52)* 
0.23 
(6.77)* 
0.23 
(7.96)* 
PCY -0.000 
(-5.13)* 
-0.000 
(-4.84)* 
-0.000 
(-6.91)* 
-0.000 
(-5.29)* 
-0.000 
(-6.95)* 
-0.000 
(-5.73)* 
-0.000 
(-3.86)* 
-0.000 
(-7.56)* 
Government 
Spending 
-0.036 
(-4.25)* 
-0.04 
(-4.59)* 
-0.04 
(-3.32)* 
-0.04 
(-4.13)* 
-0.04 
(-4.36)* 
-0.03 
(-3.29)* 
-0.04 
(-4.32)* 
-0.02 
(-2.51)* 
Openness 0.006 
(5.36)* 
0.006 
(5.43)* 
0.004 
(2.93)* 
0.007 
(5.72)* 
0.006 
(4.71)* 
0.006 
(5.23)* 
0.006 
(5.37)* 
0.002 
(1.65)*** 
Ethnic 
Tensions 
 -0.097 
(-2.65)* 
      
Military 
Spending 
  0.003 
(0.37) 
     
Urbanization     0.000  
(2.50)* 
    
Remittances     0.014 
(1.5) 
   
Inflation      0.000 
(1.68)*** 
  
Socioecono
mic 
Conditions 
      -.05 
(-1.91)*** 
 
Yr1993        -0.15 
(-1.87)* 
Yr1998        -0.09 
(-1.12) 
Yr2003        0.54 
(6.53)* 
Yr2007        0.85 
(9.76)* 
RB 0.53 0.54 0.61 0.52 0.68 0.58 0.54 0.64 
RO 0.45 0.46 0.52 0.45 0.54 0.49 0.46 0.57 
Observations  602 598 598 598 501 566 598 598 
Note: *, **, and *** denote statistically significant at the 1 %, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
Table 16: Corruption and Military in Politics: Panel Estimation using Alternative 
Techniques  
Variables  2SLS LIML GMM 
Military in 
Politics 
0.11 
(2.15)** 
0.14 
(2.75)* 
0.09 
(1.7)*** 
0.11 
(2.15)** 
0.14 
(2.75)* 
0.09 
(1.7)*** 
0.11 
(2.26)* 
0.14 
(2.93)* 
0.08 
(1.61)***
PCY -0.000 
(-7.62)* 
-0.000 
(-7.98)* 
-0.000 
(-5.11)* 
-0.000 
(-7.61)* 
-0.000 
(-7.98)* 
-0.000 
(-5.11)* 
-0.000 
(-7.37)* 
-0.000 
(-7.55)* 
-0.000 
(-5.18)* 
Economic 
Freedom 
-0.19 
(-5.08)* 
-0.16 
(-3.83)* 
-0.13 
(-3.27)* 
-0.19 
(-5.08)* 
-0.16 
(-3.81)* 
-0.13 
(-3.27)* 
-0.20 
(-5.25)* 
-0.17 
(-4.13)* 
-0.13 
(-3.55)* 
Government 
Spending  
-.019 
(-1.7)*** 
-.020 
(-1.7)*** 
-.017 
(-1.6)*** 
-.019 
(-1.7)*** 
-.020 
(-1.7)*** 
-.017 
(-1.6)*** 
-.019 
(-1.8)*** 
-.019 
(-1.7)*** 
-.017 
(-1.7)*** 
Openness 0.001 
(1.66)*** 
0.002 
(1.62)*** 
0.002 
(1.7)*** 
0.001 
(1.66)***
0.002 
(1.62)***
0.002 
(1.73)*** 
0.002 
(1.48) 
0.002 
(1.40) 
0.002 
(1.61)***
Inflation   0.000 
(0.65) 
0.000 
(2.59)* 
 0.000 
(0.64) 
0.000 
(2.59)* 
 0.000 
(0.68) 
0.000 
(3.93)* 
Bureaucracy 
Quality  
  -0.24 
(-2.70) 
  -0.24 
(-2.69) 
  -0.24 
(-2.98) 
Sargan  0.83 
(0.36) 
0.98 
(0.32) 
1.28 
(0.53) 
0.84 
(0.36) 
0.99 
(0.32) 
1.28 
(0.53) 
   
Basmann 0.81 
(0.36) 
0.96 
(0.32) 
1.24 
(0.54) 
0.81 
(0.37) 
0.96 
(0.33) 
0.62 
(0.54) 
   
Hansen        0.66 
(0.42) 
0.85 
(0.36) 
1.44 
(0.49) 
Wald 382.38 
(0.000) 
417.02 
(0.000) 
453.13 
(0.000) 
382.386 
(0.000) 
416.96 
(0.000) 
457.05 
(0.000) 
375.88 
(0.000) 
418.20 
(0.000) 
482.54 
(0.000) 
R 0.53 0.57 0.60 0.53 0.57 0.60 0.53 0.57 0.60 
Observations  340 324 324 340 324 324 340 324 324 
Note: *, **, and *** denote statistically significant at the 1 %, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
Table 17: Corruption and Military in Politics: Panel Estimation: System GMM 
Variables  Dependent Variable: Corruption  
Military in 
Politics 
0.08 
(1.70)*** 
0.08 
(1.62)* 
0.096 
(2.06)** 
0.08 
(1.60)*** 
0.09 
(1.99)** 
.096 
(2.30)* 
0.10 
(2.42)* 
0.11 
(2.87)* 
PCY -0.000 
(-2.83)* 
-0.000 
(-2.70)* 
0.000 
(-4.06)* 
-0.000 
(-2.87)* 
-0.000 
(-3.68)* 
-0.000 
(-5.19)* 
-0.000 
(-5.73)* 
-0.000 
(-5.90)* 
Economic 
Freedom 
-0.14 
(-3.52)* 
-0.04 
(-3.47)* 
-0.14 
(-3.66)* 
-0.15 
(-3.56)* 
-0.14 
(-3.72)* 
-0.11 
(-2.84)* 
-0.12 
(-3.34)* 
-0.11 
(-3.52)* 
Rule of Law -0.33 
(-6.55)* 
-0.006 
(-6.19)* 
-0.31 
(-6.36)* 
-0.31 
(-6.13)* 
-0.34 
(-6.4)* 
-0.29 
(-6.25)* 
-0.26 
(-5.67)* 
-0.29 
(-6.55)* 
Openness   0.001 
(0.89) 
   0.002 
(1.73)*** 
0.001 
(1.25) 
 
Inflation    0.000 
(0.65) 
   0.000 
(1.49) 
0.000 
(2.58)* 
Government 
Stability  
   0.069 
(1.95)** 
    
Socioeconomic 
Conditions 
    0.11 
(2.05)** 
   
Government 
Spending 
     -0.019 
(-1.82)*** 
-0.017 
(-1.62)*** 
-0.017 
(-1.62)*** 
Urbanization         0.000 
(0.82) 
Yr1988 -1.14 
(-8.88)* 
-1.12 
(-8.29)* 
-1.19 
(-10.32)* 
-1.31 
(-9.16)* 
-1.19 
(-9.15)* 
-1.02 
(-7.27)* 
-1.05 
(-7.62)* 
-1.16 
(-10.70)* 
Yr1993 -1.24 
(-11.1)* 
-1.22 
(-10.19)* 
-1.25 
(-12.60)* 
-1.41 
(-10.24)* 
-1.26 
(-10.39)* 
-1.11 
(-9.59)* 
-1.12 
(-10.35)* 
-1.17 
(-12.68)* 
Yr1998 -0.86 
(-8.69)* 
-0.84 
(-7.80)* 
-0.88 
(-10.53)* 
-0.93 
(-8.64)* 
-0.84 
(-7.78)* 
-0.79 
(-8.80)* 
-0.84 
(-11.19)* 
-0.87 
(-12.11)* 
Yr2003 -0.31 
(-4.52)* 
-0.29 
(-4.30)* 
-0.32 
(-4.88)* 
-0.26 
(-3.82)* 
-0.29 
(-4.09)* 
-0.24 
(-4.94)* 
-0.29 
(-5.36)* 
-0.33 
(-6.20)* 
No of groups 114 129 127 126 129 130 128 128 
Instruments  63 64 64 64 54 65 75 65 
Wald stat 360.55 
(0.000) 
333.04 
(0.000) 
457.23 
(0.000) 
407.35 
(0.000) 
449.73 
(0.000) 
568.20 
(0.000) 
601.15 
(0.000) 
659.52 
(0.000) 
Hansen Diff 16.19 
(0.57) 
15.74 
(0.61) 
24.27 
(0.14) 
14.89 
(0.67) 
15.84 
(0.39) 
17.50 
(0.49) 
24.50 
(0.26) 
17.60 
(0.48) 
Observations  601 590 567 601 601 591 560 577 
Note: *, **, and *** denote statistically significant at the 1 %, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
Appendix: 
Table: List of Countries 
1 Albania 41 Ethiopia 81 Mali 121 Sri Lanka 
2 Algeria 42 Finland 82 Malta 122 Sudan 
3 Angola 43 France 83 Mexico 123 Suriname 
4 Argentina 44 Gabon 84 Moldova 124 Sweden 
5 Armenia 45 Gambia 85 Mongolia 125 Switzerland 
6 Australia 46 Germany 86 Morocco 126 Syria 
7 Austria 47 Ghana 87 Mozambique 127 Taiwan 
8 Azerbaijan 48 Greece 88 Myanmar 128 Tanzania 
9 Bahamas 49 Guatemala 89 Namibia 129 Thailand 
10 Bahrain 50 Guinea 90 Netherlands 130 Togo 
11 Bangladesh 51 Guinea-Bissau 91 New Caledonia 131 Trinidad & Tobago 
12 Belarus 52 Guyana 92 New Zealand 132 Tunisia 
13 Belgium 53 Haiti 93 Nicaragua 133 Turkey 
14 Bolivia 54 Honduras 94 Niger 134 UAE 
15 Botswana 55 Hong Kong 95 Nigeria 135 Uganda 
16 Brazil 56 Hungary 96 Norway 136 Ukraine 
17 Brunei 57 Iceland 97 Oman 137 United Kingdom 
18 Bulgaria 58 India 98 Pakistan 138 United States 
19 Burkina Faso 59 Indonesia 99 Panama 139 Uruguay 
20 Cameroon 60 Iran 100 Papua N Guinea 140 USSR 
21 Canada 61 Iraq 101 Paraguay 141 Venezuela 
22 Chile 62 Ireland 102 Peru 142 Vietnam 
23 China 63 Israel 103 Philippines 143 West Germany 
24 Colombia 64 Italy 104 Poland 144 Yemen 
25 Congo 65 Jamaica 105 Portugal 145 Zambia 
26 Congo, DR 66 Japan 106 Qatar 146 Zimbabwe 
27 Costa Rica 67 Jordan 107 Romania 
28 Cote d'Ivoire 68 Kazakstan 108 Russia 
29 Croatia 69 Kenya 109 Saudi Arabia 
30 Cuba 70 Korea, DPR 110 Senegal 
31 Cyprus 71 Kuwait 111 Serbia  
32 Czech Republic 72 Latvia 112 Serbia & Monten 
33 Czechoslovakia 73 Lebanon 113 Sierra Leone 
34 Denmark 74 Liberia 114 Singapore 
35 Dominican Rep 75 Libya 115 Slovakia 
36 East Germany 76 Lithuania 116 Slovenia 
37 Ecuador 77 Luxembourg 117 Somalia 
38 Egypt 78 Madagascar 118 South Africa 
39 El Salvador 79 Malawi 119 South Korea 
40 Estonia 80 Malaysia 120 Spain 
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